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All of Europe’s new democracies, from the Baltic to the Black Sea and all 
that lie between, should have the same chance for security and freedom – 
and the same chance to join the institutions of Europe – as Europe’s old 
democracies have … I believe in NATO membership for all of Europe’s 
democracies that seek it and are ready to share responsibilities that NATO 
brings … as we plan to enlarge NATO, no nation should be used as a 
pawn in the agenda of others … we will not trade away the fate of free 
European peoples … no more Munichs … no more Yaltas … as we plan 
the Prague Summit, we should not calculate how little we can get away 
with, but how much we can do to advance the cause of freedom.1 The US 
President George W. Bush, Warsaw, 15 June 2001. 
Since the end of the Cold War, membership in Euro-Atlantic institutions has been 
the top priority issue in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and particularly applies to 
membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union 
(EU). Croatia, sharing the same goals and values, is no exception to such trends. 
However, during the past decade it has encountered tremendous obstacles to integration 
into those institutions. Obviously, Croatia could not have thought about acceptance into 
NATO and the EU during the period when the struggle for national independence 
overshadowed all other issues. In achieving independence in 1991, Croatia paid a high 
price socio-politically and economically, to say nothing of human losses. In essence, one 
could argue that Croatia fell behind the normal pace of participation in Western 
integration by at least ten years. This setback happened primarily due to Serbian 
aggression, but also because of the lingering Western stereotypes about Croatia and 
divergent political interests of European powers in the region, and, to a lesser extent, due 
to problems of domestic politics that reverberated beyond Croatia’s borders. In early 
2000, significant socio-political changes began to unfold in Croatia, and during the 
subsequent two years all formal barriers to Croatia’s integration into Western institutions 
disappeared.  
 
                                                 
1 197th Congress, 1st Session, 24 October 2001, Statement of the US President George W. Bush in his speech in 




This thesis seeks to provide sufficient evidence that Croatia is equally or better 
prepared to become a member of NATO than many other serious aspirants. Undoubtedly, 
Croatia is among the best-prepared aspirant countries for NATO membership in terms of 
its political, economic and military status. Moreover, thanks to its geo-strategic position, 
Croatia can offer NATO numerous advantages that other aspiring nations cannot. 
However, the question of why Croatia has not achieved membership much earlier in 
Euro-Atlantic institutions, and particularly NATO, has emerged. An answer to this 
question must include a broader picture of the crucial moments that occurred both inside 
Croatia and its surrounding areas during the 20th century and especially during the 1990s. 
This broader picture will provide the context that unambiguously shows that the next 
logical step toward the stabilization of Southeastern Europe is Croatia’s membership in 
NATO. It will also address various benefits that the neighboring countries might reap 
from Croatian membership in the Alliance. 
B. THESIS RELEVANCE 
Croatia believes that its chances for membership are outstanding in comparison 
with other aspirant nations because of its ability to offer more benefits with less risk than 
other NATO candidates. At the same time, membership in NATO will increase the level 
of security within Croatia, which is important because of region instability. Although 
Croatia encounters difficulties on its path toward the desired membership in NATO and 
the EU, Croatia is positioned to overcome these obstacles with greater speed than 
expected. However, the influence and level of support of the international community, 
especially the United States and other members of NATO and the EU, are essential to the 
success or failure of Croatia’s aspirations for membership.   
This thesis will argue that if Croatia becomes a NATO member in 2002, its 
membership will provide enhanced stability to Southeastern Europe and therefore reduce 
the area of instability to Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina only. Thus, the zone of 
stability in Europe will grow, allowing the probability for future conflicts in Southeastern 
Europe to become more an object of speculation than a real concern.  
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C. BACKGROUND 
Two unexpected events tremendously changed the recent political map of the 
world with unforeseeable consequences for the future development of mankind. The first 
event was the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989. It marked the end of 
communism and the ideological division of Europe and the World. The second event 
occurred in 2001 when ‘fortress America’ was attacked, which arguably ended American 
isolationism of the early 1990s. Although the September 11 attacks are too recent for a 
full analysis, the consequences have already manifested a remarkable new set of 
challenges and strategic alignments.2 In light of those two events, the further 
consolidation and strengthening of democratic forces around the world is evident. This is 
especially obvious in Europe, where the initial steps toward a democratically integrated 
and secure continent have already been taken, although there remains a considerable 
amount of work to be done in the near and the distant future.  
After the mighty communist empire simply imploded and disappeared in front of 
a shocked Western audience, Europe found itself in a radically new security environment. 
Together with the Berlin Wall, the Soviet threat was gone, which automatically raised the 
question of the purposefulness of Pax Americana in the forthcoming period. Moreover, 
“the general reluctance on the part of major powers … to attain George Bush’s Pax 
Universalis, built upon shared responsibilities and aspirations,”3 deepened differences 
about the future security composition of Europe. This, along with German unification, 
caused the mutual suspiciousness among old European powers and resurrected their 
alignment according to the lines of 1914 and 1940. This alignment was most obvious 
during the European engagement in the crisis in the  former Yugoslavia. Under the 
circumstances where the need for collective defense declined, and with the United States 
(US) preoccupied with the Gulf crisis, NATO underwent the period of questioning its 
raison d'être. Thus, some sort of security vacuum emerged in Europe and lasted for a few 
                                                 
2 “The establishment of the anti-terrorist coalition represents the beginning of deep and far-reaching changes on 
the world political scene. I am speaking about the changes in relations between countries or groups of countries, and 
the changes in the nature and way of functioning of international alliances, such as NATO for example, as well as 
international organizations.” Speech of the President of the Republic of Croatia, Mr. Stjepan Mesic, at the UN General 
Assembly on 11 November 2001, http://www.predsjednik.hr/english/speeches/11_11_2001_3.html. 
3 Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time (New York: 
Oxford University Press 1995) p. 144.  
 4
years, until the US decided to stop Serbian aggression in 1994/95, and to bring peace to 
Southeastern Europe. The consequences of reestablished US leadership in Europe quickly 
resulted in the decline of tensions among allies and in numerous initiatives that improved 
the European security picture. It also enabled the process of European integration, despite 
existing obstacles, to continue to advance, and bring more and more nations to the 
European mainstream.  
These integrations occurred on two parallel fronts. The first was NATO 
enlargement and the close cooperation among members and partner states and the second 
was economic prosperity through membership in the EU and its related programs. Thus, 
“NATO and EU enlargements are closely linked both politically and strategically.”4 
Consequently, “[for CEE countries] the EU … will be the engine of Europe’s prosperity 
… and NATO would be the instrument of their Wirtschaftswunder … as it was for 
Western Europeans [after WWII]”5. As those changes become more imminent, both 
positive and negative feelings emerged among European nations. On one side there is an 
exclusive club of Western European nations who have enjoyed democracy long enough 
to develop themselves economically. Their perception of a united Europe was formed 
through centuries of mutual conflicts and after decades of the Cold War where NATO 
provided security and economic support was bolstered by the US. On the other side there 
is the group of smaller, underdeveloped, CEE nations carrying the burden of being the 
object of historical deals among great powers. Although things may appear peaceful on 
the surface, “the question of who would … control CEE”6 has shown that old European 
rivalries still boil within. The ten years of turmoil in the former Yugoslavia illustrated the 
capacity of those seemingly quiet areas to explode into an international scale problem. 
However, following the fall of the Berlin Wall, it seemed that this new age would bring 
the long expected prosperity, and that conditions had been met for a decisive step toward 
the realization of the dream of a unified Europe. 
                                                 
4 NATO Parliamentary Assembly: Political Sub-Committee on CEE, Report: NATO Enlargement, 
http://www.naa.be/publications/comrep/2001/au-214-e.html#1. 
5 Lawrence S. Kaplan, The Long Entanglement: NATO First Fifty Years, Praeger, Westport CT, 1999, p. 198. 
6 Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time, New York, 
Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 144.  
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After a decade of preparations and repositioning, the first decade of the 21st 
century offered a unique opportunity to realize the centuries old dream of a unified 
Europe, a Europe without devastating wars, irreconcilable hostilities, dominating 
ideologies, iron curtains, and impassable borders or ‘a Europe whole and free’. Although 
this may sound overly idealistic, the most important preconditions for such a scenario 
have already been fulfilled. With regard to politics, there are no major differences 
between the political systems in Western Europe and the new democracies in Central and, 
to a lesser extent, Eastern Europe. In terms of economic progress, the EU finished 
enormous preparations for the establishment of a common European market in 1992, and 
introduced a common currency on 1 January 2002. Those historical changes, coupled 
with the relatively successful economic transition that took place in the CEE, will 
facilitate a further expansion of the EU.  
With regard to security, NATO successfully overcame its identity crisis, 
conducted a major consolidation and reorganization, and continued to serve as the main 
pillar of security and stability throughout Europe. Despite the initial skepticism about 
NATO enlargement and some catastrophic predictions,7 practice showed that acceptance 
of new NATO members improved the European security picture. Those points being 
considered, further EU expansion and NATO enlargement offer much room for 
optimism. 
1. Crisis in Former Yugoslavia 
The only remaining problematic area in the relatively promising European 
environment is the region of Southeastern Europe or, more specifically, the former 
Yugoslavia. Finding an appropriate solution for the sequence of events that hit the region 
during the 1990s is a difficult task. “The divergent approaches … taken by the major EU 
countries was informed both by differing perceptions of the conflict and by a disparity in 
objectives at various times.”8 Beside major European powers, Russia and the US have 
maintained divergent interests in the region, which created a highly complicated situation 
in which everybody wants to have a say, but no one wants to take full responsibility for a 
                                                 
7 Illustration of the views on NATO is Kenneth Waltz’s statement: “NATO is disappearing thing. It is a question 
of how long it is going to remain as a significant institution even though its name may linger on.” Quoted in Thomas 
Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies, Princeton Studies in International History and Politics, 1997, p. 220. 
8 James Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will, Columbia University Press, NY, 1997, p. 182. 
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long- lasting stabilization and economic recovery of the region.  There is no doubt that the 
major blame for the crises and wars during the 1990s is to be put on the Serbs. Their 
actions caused the wars and can be blamed for some of the most unspeakable atrocities 
seen in Europe since the Nazi times. However, the international community must also 
claim an equal amount of responsibility for the United Nations (UN) Security Council's 
failure to prevent or stop Serbian aggression against neighboring nations.  
The lack of interest and political will is clearly described in General 
Shalikashvili’s statement “What took place at that moment was what I would call a 
holiday from leadership. The Europeans were not yet up to it, and the Americans were for 
a variety of reasons taking time off.”9 That situation actually helped the Serbs to carry out 
attacks on their disarmed neighbors, especially after the UN imposed an arms embargo 
that prevented the nations attacked from defending themselves, while Serbia “was almost 
self-sufficient as an arms producer.10” This caused an enormous number of casualties and 
millions of refugees. Unfortunately, three NATO countries, the US, the United Kingdom 
(UK) and France, are permanent members of the UN Security Council and they 
consequently share a certain amount of responsibility for the present situation in the 
region. This presents Croatia with a frustrating situation that cannot be easily resolved. 
Under such circumstances, any position that Croatia takes is connected with incalculable 
risks. 
If Croatia attempts to raise the question of Western rejection of its independence 
in 1991 and inexcusable behavior of the West during the Serbian aggression against 
Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Croatia's chances for membership in Western 
integration would be diminished. On the contrary, if Croatia acknowledges that Western 
policy during the 1990s was satisfactory, it would represent the acceptance of almost 
equal responsibility with the Serbs for the wars between 1991-95. This creates the  
situation in which Croatia is a hostage of its ambition to join Western institutions where it 
historically, culturally and naturally belongs. Even worse, Croatia has been continuously 
seen as mainly responsible for the destruction of the beloved Yugoslavia of Tito’s era. 
                                                 
9 David Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace, Scribner, New York, 2001, p. 88. 
10 Alex Danchev and Thomas Halverson eds, International Perspective of the Yugoslav Conflict, St. Martin Press, 
Inc., 1996, p. 153. 
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Such double standards used by the Western powers, especially the UK and France, 
caused the crisis to worsen and produced catastrophic side effects including ethnic 
cleansing and genocide.  
Despite the fact that from the very beginning of its existence Croatia strived for 
closer relationships with Western European countries and the US, it was not warmly 
welcomed by either. Paradoxically, Western support was given to Milosevic’s 
communists who later transformed into some kind of national-socialist hybrid closely 
resembling the Nazis. Also it was “intolerable that, 18 months after the collapse of 
communism … two republics with democratically elected governments should be 
crushed by a communist- led army”11 Croatia and Slovenia were suspected of being 
nationalists. Moreover, some Western governments perceived Croatia as the state that 
caused the breakup of Yugoslavia and consequently must bear responsibility for the 
crises and wars that followed the declarations of Croatian and Slovenian independence. 
States such as Germany12, which tried to help Croatia escape such a destiny, were 
immediately accused of attempting to restore old ties from WWII. 
Thus, the normal historical process of dissolution of multinational communist 
states, which was accepted and supported by the West in the case of the Soviet Union and 
Czechoslovakia, was denied to all non-Serbian nations of the former Yugoslavia. Efforts 
to explain that the formation of the former Yugoslavia was the consequence of balance-
of-power politics practiced in Versailles and Yalta fell on deaf ears, mostly because of 
the role of the same powers at both conferences. Despite this, Croatia and Slovenia, 
“following the example of Baltic republics of the Soviet Union,”13 continued with their 
preparation for independence. After it became obvious that the survival of Yugoslavia, 
unwanted by most of its constitutive nations, would be impossible, the West unwillingly 
recognized Croatia and Slovenia. But, the recognition by the West also brought many 
challenges to Croatia.  
                                                 
11 The Independent, 4 July 1991, quoted in James Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will, Columbia University Press, 
NY, 1997, p. 49. 
12 Actually UK, France, Spain and Greece were against the recognition, while all others European states were in 
favor. James Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will, Columbia University Press, NY, 1997, p. 160. 
13 Alex Danchev and Thomas Halverson eds., International Perspective of the Yugoslav Conflict, St. Martin 
Press, Inc., 1996, p. 130. 
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According to the Milosevic-Kucan deal, Slovenia was allowed to walk away from 
the continuing crisis in the region while Croatia was forced to remain deeply involved in 
the chaos caused by the Serbian occupation of one third of Croatian territory in concert 
with the unresolved situation in BiH. 14  Faced with the aforementioned circumstances, 
Croatia fought desperately for its very survival during 1991 with little or no support from 
the outside world except from the Croatian diaspora. The outnumbered, outgunned and 
inadequately equipped Croatian Army, struggling with the challenges of its recent 
formation, somehow succeeded in defending most of the Croatian territory. Despite 
suffering severe casualties, the Croatian Army protected its civilian population as much 
as it could and only failed to do so in the case of Vukovar. After three years of 
preparations, the Croatian Army liberated most of the occupied territory receiving 
compliments even from the US side, “for the first time I realize how much the Croatian 
offensive in the Krajina has profoundly changed the nature of Balkan game and thus our 
diplomatic offensive.”15 Beside being successful in defending and liberating Croatia’s 
territory under the given circumstances, the Croatian Army decisively contributed in 
1995 to the US and NATO efforts to end the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH).   
However, Croatian politicians failed to do their part by ensuring an adequate 
international position for the young republic. This failure later became one of the most 
troublesome issues during Croatian attempts to join Euro-Atlantic institutions. Indecisive 
domestic politics coupled with a lack of international support resulted in a vicious cycle. 
The cause of this cycle is hard to define, but the results are evident. Croatia is still not a 
member of the core Euro-Atlantic institutions, NATO and the EU. Worse still is the fact 
that Croatia is forced to remain categorized with other Western Balkan16 countries that 
cannot match the basic requirements for membership involved with any serious 
integration. 
                                                 
14  “Milosevic and Kucan … agreed on Slovenia’s departure from the federation … and, in fact, destroyed federal 
Yugoslavia, Richard Hoolbroke, To End a War, Random House, NY, 1998, p. 29. 
15 Ibid., p. 73. 
16 In 1997 the EU launched the new regional initiative called for ‘Western Balkans’ (Albania, BiH, Croatia, 
Macedonia, and Yugoslavia - now Serbia and Montenegro). Source: The EU’s Relations with ‘South Eastern Europe’ 
(the new euphemism for Western Balkans), http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/croatia/index.htm  
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Prior to the US direct engagement in the region in 1993, the situation was 
structured in favor of Serbian aggression. Western European (UK, France) policy was 
more concentrated on appeasement of the Serbs than on finding an appropriate 
countermeasure for stopping their aggression. Numerous examples from both the UN 
Security Council and various European institutions confirm the biased approach of 
European powers that allowed the Serbs to pursue their concept of a Greater Serbia for 
more than a decade. At the same time, the inactiveness of the international community 
was rife with theories about civil war, ancient hatreds and equal guilt. This frustrated the 
victims of aggression and resulted in their disbelief and lack of confidence in the West.  
US engagement, although later than expected, cut the Gordian knot and partially 
solved the crisis in 1995, and again in 1999, but still left many unanswered questions 
about the future composition of the region. However, it evidently showed that the 
European security system heavily depends on US leadership, and that without the US 
presence, as happened after WWI and before WWII, it tends to be inefficient and even 
mutually destructive. The only positive aspect of the 1990s for Croatia and the remainder 
of the former Yugoslavia was that the Serbs were not as powerful as the Nazis, which 
limited the amount of damage they were able to inflict.  
2. Epur si muove  
The very beginning of the year 2000 brought elections in Croatia that changed the 
internal political landscape and resulted in numerous changes in foreign policy. In less 
than two years, Croatia became a member of Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the Vilnius 
group - a group of NATO candidates, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and signed 
the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU. “What we are 
especially proud of is the fact that Croatia marks the 10th anniversary of its international 
recognition as a country which was given the index of a completely free country for the 
first time in a Freedom House report.”17 On the domestic front, changes were introduced 
at a rapid pace also. Those changes included modifications to the Constitution and the 
legal system along with the introduction of an open market economy and an improvement 
                                                 
17 Prime Minister Racan’s speech during a special session of the Croatian Parliament on the occasion of the 10th 
anniversary of Croatia's recognition by the international community.  http://www.vlada.hr/bulletin/2002/january/focus-
full.html. 
 10
in human rights. Also, the democratic changes in Croatia started a chain of events in BiH 
and Serbia where subsequent elections ushered in new, more democratic governments, 
which offered increased chances for progress in the region. 
However, while Croatia has progressed rapidly on the path to democratization, 
BiH and Serbia have taken only elementary steps. This lack of progress necessitates more 
help from outside agencies in coping with the serious problems which accumulated 
during the 1990s. Even though Croatia has the best of intentions to help BiH, it cannot 
solve all of its struggling neighbor's problems alone. Most of the impediments to 
Croatia's help to BiH arise because of perceptions from within BiH that Croatia still 
possesses an offensive posture towards the sovereignty of BiH. Moreover, expectations 
that Croatia should help Serbia, after their actions during the past decade, are unrealistic 
and would be possible only after the Serbian leadership takes formal and moral 
responsibility for Serbia's role in the war. Those factors, combined with decreasing US 
interest in the region, result in new challenges for Croatia.   
With US support, Croatia’s chances for becoming part of Western institutions are 
better and solutions to the crisis in the region appear to be much more attainable.  
Promising signals were sent from NATO Parliamentary Assembly that stated, “even 
though Croatia is not yet participating in MAP, NATO should extend the invitation to 
include it.”18 Expecting such a positive development, Croatia already adapted defense-
related laws and published basic strategic documents,19 preparing itself for entrance into 
the Membership Action Plan (MAP) by shaping its Annual National Program (ANP). 
After finishing those, Croatia will fulfill all formal demands for the NATO summit in 
Prague by the end of 2002 and will hopefully find itself among the most qualified 
candidates for NATO membership. Political, economic and military indicators in Croatia 
all favor Croatia’s current position in comparison with other aspirant countries. 
Moreover, the general improvement of European security, following the entry of three 
CEE countries into NATO, bolsters optimism that aspirant nations for the next round of 
                                                 
18 NATO Parliamentary Assembly: Political Sub-Committee on Central and Eastern Europe, Study: NATO 
Enlargement, http://www.naa.be/publications/comrep/2001/au-214-e.html#1. 
19 Croatian Parliament adopted on 15 March 2002 five defense-related laws along with National Security Strategy 
and Defense Strategy. Source: Vjesnik, 16 March 2002, http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/Default.asp. 
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enlargement will be accepted with less reluctance and suspicion. Thus, the zone of 
stability in Europe will grow, allowing the probability for future conflicts to become 
more an object of speculation than real concern.  
However, possible US disengagement in the region is the worst thing that could 
happen to Croatia. Without US leadership and support for NATO enlargement, it is 
hardly possible for Croatia to accelerate its progress towards entering Euro-Atlantic 
institutions. During the worst period of Croatia’s newest history, from 1991-1995, 
Europeans did not demonstrate very much understanding for Croatian problems. Rather, 
their “competing interests … served to prevent or hold back [Croats] … to realize their 
national ambition.”20 If Croatian democratic achievements continue to be ignored, as it 
mainly happened in the realm of the EU, Croatia will remain part of the slowly moving 
Balkan convoy progressing at a sluggish pace towards its aspirations. This scenario may 
seem pessimistic, but history is full of examples of Western inattention to the region. 
In addition, there are two stumbling blocks which need to be addressed on the 
road towards Croatian membership in NATO. First, the contradictory interests of the 
Western European countries in the region could result in the lack of political will to 
accept Croatia in the relevant institutions. Secondly, there is skepticism concerning the 
behavior on the part of Croatian politicians who superimpose their individual interests to 
the good of the nation. The second obstacle is already being dealt with through the 
democratic political structure in Croatia. However, the solution is not as simple as a 
surface analysis would indicate, because it is not mutually exclusive with the first. Both 
issues have to be examined as parts of a whole, and a democratic process cannot have 
immediate results. If it did, it would certainly be suspect of even being democratic. Given 
that establishing a new democracy is an ongoing process, Croatia can only enhance and 
speed up its transition to a nation with a mature democracy through integration into the 
Euro-Atlantic institutions. 
To have a better understanding of how the two obstacles are interconnected, it 
must be unequivocally stated at the outset that Croatia is sufficiently qualified to be a 
                                                 
20 Alex N. Dragnich, Serbs and Croats: The Struggle in Yugoslavia, Harcourt Brace & Company, NY, 1992, p. 
xiii. 
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member of NATO. One could make the case, based upon the recent socio-political 
changes and developments in Croatia, that Croatia is one of the best-qualified candidates 
for acceptance into the Alliance. In spite of any qualification that Croatia may have for 
membership in any Western alliance, the political perception in the West is burdened 
with disapprobation, partly justified by viewing Croatia in the context of its association 
with Nazi Germany of WWII. In other words, there is an a priori judgment against 
Croatia, a pervasive obstacle for any per fas et nefas. Therefore, certain issues, such as 
human and minority rights, have been overly emphasized occasionally, e.g., Serbs in 
Croatia. Naturally, such tendencies have drastic consequences upon the domestic political 
development and the full implementation of democratic standards in Croatia. 
The domestic policy in Croatia between 1990 and 2000 may have been somewhat 
chaotic, disorganized and prone to ad hoc solutions as opposed to having standardized 
approaches and mechanisms in place for problem solving. Such a situation is not too 
surprising, either, considering that a newly created, inexperienced government had to deal 
not only with establishing a functioning system, but also had to organize a defensive war 
against a much stronger enemy. The transitional processes that took place within most 
other CEE countries were, therefore, postponed, and had to take place in the second half 
of the decade. Even then, the processes of democratization and privatization did not flow 
smoothly, as the country was burdened by a significant number of refugees, mainly from 
BiH, and by the devastation and casualties left after the war. That period, however, was 
not used for strengthening the state institutions necessary for the transition process, which 
further postponed the stabilization of the country. Nevertheless, the potentials and the 
capability for it were there. The government elected in 2000 has proven that the major 
transition processes could be accomplished within a relatively short time in spite of the 
delays. 
Those recent achievements and the current Croatian ambition for Western 
integrations are not very new, as a brief overview of the Croatian history will show. 
Many times in history there have been attempts and tendencies in Croatia to form 
coalitions and partnerships with its western neighbors. For a variety of reasons, those 
attempts and tendencies remained fruitless, mainly because of the complex geopolitical 
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position of Croatia and the frequently repeated international pressure upon Croatia to 
build coalitions with its eastern neighbors during the 20th century. 
D. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
To facilitate the uninterrupted flow of this thesis, the content is divided in four 
chapters. Chapter II covers a short historical overview of Croatia including the major 
events that bring it to the beginning of the 21st century.  This chapter attempts to explain 
Croatia’s centuries old dream of full independence. It also contains reasons that forced 
Croatians to respond in the way they did regardless of human sacrifice or obstacles 
imposed from external factors. That tendency culminated by the end of 1980s and 
beginning of the 1990s with only one possible result: international recognition of a 
sovereign Croatian state. In the aftermath of the wars in the 1990s, the results of 
international involvement were actually not successful for Croatia, and left Croatians 
feeling as though their interests had been sacrificed for the ‘higher ideals’ of European 
stability 
Chapter III examines the establishment and the development of NATO and its 
role during the Cold War and the wars in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s, 
particularly during the war in BiH. Within that period, Croatia became a sort of ‘silent 
NATO partner’, helping the US and NATO resolve the crisis in BiH which resulted in the 
signing of the (un)successful Dayton Agreement, which brought an end to the war. Those 
developments allowed the US to regain a strategic initiative resulting in the creation of 
the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and NATO membership for three CEE countries. 
However, following the NATO intervention in Kosovo and the political changes in 
Croatia, a new set of circumstances offers a more cooperative approach from all sides, 
which might result in Croatia’s transition from a silent partner to full membership. 
Chapter IV deals with changes in Croatia that occurred between 2000 and 2002. 
Those changes included the establishment of a new framework for cooperation with the 
West, along with the prospect of Croatia's future participation in Euro-Atlantic 
institutions. During that period, Croatia became a member of a variety of international 
institutions, except the two most important, NATO and the EU. However, this increased 
Croatia's participation in various regional initiatives and improved the possibility of 
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Croatia to become a NATO member. Croatian institutions made serious efforts to achieve 
the status of a MAP country. The final decision regarding Croatia's NATO membership 
will be made during NATO’s Prague summit in November 2002. Croatia believes that its 
chances for membership are outstanding in comparison with other aspirant nations 
because of its ability to offer more benefits with less risk than other NATO candidates. 
This chapter explores what positive consequences might result from Croatian 
membership in NATO. It will also show the inevitability of changes in the international 
community's approach to Croatia, and offer possible solutions when, combined with 
Croatian NATO membership, can improve regional stability in a relatively short period 
of time. Thus, the most complicated crisis in Europe following WWII can be brought to a 
close. 
Finally, the conclusions suggest that the most logical contribution to stability and 
prosperity of the region and Europe is a swift and decisive inauguration of Croatia into 
NATO and other Western institutions. It would also be the next logical step in the 




II. CROATIA – A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
There is no force in the world that could quash Croatian aspirations. 
Sooner will Velebit mountains collapse into the sea, sooner will the Drava 
and the Sava run dry, than we may see the Croats to give up their 
aspirations for preservation and free development of their identity. 21 
Svetozar Pribicevic, political leader of Croatian Serbs during 1920s. 
Croatia’s location in an extremely exposed geo-strategic position has brought it 
more troubles than benefits. Centuries of existence on the frontlines under foreign 
domination have resulted in the decimation of the population and a loss of territory.  
After the early medieval Croatian state vanished in 1102, Croatia spent the following 
eight centuries as part of several common states. Croatia was first part of the Croatian-
Hungarian Kingdom, then part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and finally a part of 
Yugoslavia from 1918-1991.  Despite their lack of independence for a period of almost 
nine centuries, Croatians always maintained their own government.  The Croatian viceroy 
or ban and the Croatian parliament or Sabor22, remained more or less independent from 
the central state throughout this lengthy period.  In addition to their long tradition of 
(semi) self-government, Croats are extremely sensitive about their Catholicism and 
centuries old connection with Western Europe. 
Croats accepted Christianity immediately after their migration in the 7th century.  
Christianity decisively shaped their culture until current times, and became a matter of 
huge significance during the 20th century.  A short overview of Croatian history is 
necessary for a clear understanding of the Croatian position in the region and Europe. 
Knowledge of Croatian persistence in its struggle for independence may shed some light 
on Croatia’s eagerness for membership in Western institutions.  An ove rview of history 
will also illuminate the complexity of the situation in a region where the mixture of 
nations, languages and religions makes any solution extremely complicated. A further 
                                                 
21 Svetozar Pribicevic, The Dictatorship of King Aleksandar, 1933, quoted in Ivo Peric, A History of the Croats, 
CTT, Zagreb 1998. p. 205. Pribicevic was the leader of Croatian Serbs and proponent of a Greater Serbia who, by using 
all possible tricks, fraudulently made the creation of a common state possible. 
22 The only, but significant, exception was the period between 1929-1939 when the Serbian king, through the 
royal coup, banned political parties and abandoned the Croatian parliament.  
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issue of importance is the strangest phenomena to occur in the Balkans during last 150 
years or the concept of a Greater Serbia, which frequently caused tremors on a regional, 
European and even global level. That concept, based on a policy of deceit and violence, 
and supported by myths about a ‘chosen people,’ resulted in the usage “of different 
means, from armed aggression to the systematic spreading of untruths … trying to prove 
that … their projects were humanitarian, rightful, progressive and noble.”23 On the 
contrary, “within the project of Serbian expansionism, a global system of spreading 
untruths was persistently constructed, ranging from marginalization to open denial of the 
cultural and ethnic features and rights”24 of neighboring nations, especially Croats. 
A. CROATIA UNTIL 1918 
Croatian statehood appears as early as the late 8th century and was interrupted 
when Charlemagne’s Franks conquered most of Europe including Croatia whose dukes 
became Franks’ vassals.25 Regaining full independence in the second half of 9th century, 
Croatian dukes consolidated the state that became powerful and reached its zenith under 
Tomislav (910-928), the first Croatian King, who received all royal insignia from the 
Pope. King Tomislav fought successfully against the Hungarians in the North, and the 
Bulgarians in the East, allowing the establishment of a Croatian Kingdom that covered an 
area approximately the size of today’s Croatia and BiH combined.26 The Kingdom lasted 
for almost two centuries, and most of the time, the capitol was the city of Knin. 
The Croatian part of the Kingdom lasted until 1102 when the last Croatian king 
died without descendants. The Bosnian part became separate and lasted until the 
Ottomans occupied Bosnia.  Croatian nobles could not agree on his successor but his wife 
and a sister to the Hungarian King succeeded in merging the two kingdoms.  The Queen's 
brother Coloman (Kalman) became the first Croatian-Hungarian king.  This agreement 
between the Hungarians and Croats is known as the Pacta conventa.27 The signing of that 
document represented the beginning of the personal union between Croatia and Hungary 
                                                 
23 Boze Covic ed., Roots of Serbian Aggression, Center for Foreign Languages and AGM d.o.o., Zagreb, 1993, p. 
15. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Marcus Tanner, Croatia: A Nation Forged in War, Yale University Press, 1997, pp. 7-8. 
26 Vjekoslav Klaic: Povijest Hrvata (The History of Croats), Volume I. Nakladni Zavod Matice Hrvatske, Zagreb, 
1985, pp. 98-107. 
27 King Coloman assumed the title: King of Hungary, Croatia and Dalmatia, p. 152. 
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which lasted more than four centuries. It was not an idyllic relationship and, similar to the 
rest of Europe, was full of intrigues and plots resulting from time to time in the overthrow 
of ruling kings and the inauguration of new ones, but it lasted long enough to be 
considered a stable kingdom.  
However, during the 15th century, the Croatian-Hungarian kingdom began to 
decline, losing territories along the Adriatic coast to Venice while at the same time facing 
an increasing threat from the Ottoman Empire.  The Ottomans had conquered the remains 
of the Serbian kingdom during the second half of the 14th century and had occupied 
Bosnia by 1463.  The constant Croatian-Hungarian fight against the Ottomans during the 
second half of the 15th century and first decades of the 16th century resulted in heavy 
territorial and human losses and eventually led to the final Ottoman victory in Mohacs in 
1526. This final battle was lost mainly because of a lack of support from Europe against 
the Ottomans. The lack of European support can be at least partially attributed to the 
declining influence of the Pope following the Diet of Worms in 1521.28  “The outcome of 
Mohacs held great significance for the future of Central Europe … [and] opened 
[Ottomans] the road to the heart of the continent.”29 Thus, the destiny of Croatia was 
again redirected, bringing about circumstances in which the Croatian gentry had to 
choose a new ruler.  
Their choice was the Austrian King Ferdinand I Habsburg, brother of the Holy 
Roman Emperor Charles V. It is apparent that Ferdinand was elected because of the 
belief “that the union with Austria would make defense against the Ottomans more 
effective.”30 Although the Austrians made huge efforts to protect their new possessions, 
the Ottomans advanced steadily and captured more than half of Hungary and almost 
three-quarters of Croatia by the end of the 16th century. These extensive Ottoman gains 
reduced Croatia to ‘remains of remains’ (reliquiae reliquiarum). Still another problem 
was the displacement of the Croatian population toward the northwest in an attempt to 
escape Ottoman brutalities. Ottoman occupation also resulted in the arrival of the 
Walachians, an Orthodox nomadic tribe, to the depopulated Croatian territories.  
                                                 
28 Hagen Schulze, States, Nations and Nationalism, Blackwell Publishers Ltd, p. 43. 
29 Marcus Tanner, Croatia: A Nation Forged in War, Yale University Press, 1997, p. 34. 
30 Ivo Peric, A History of the Croats, CTT, Zagreb 1998. p. 87. 
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The Austrians responded by bringing more Walachians 31 and by the creation of 
the Military Frontier or Vojna Krajina directly subordinated to Vienna. This resulted in 
the division of Croatia among the Ottomans, Venetians, Austrians and Hungarians. Only 
the small area around Zagreb remained under Croatian control. Compliments that the 
Croatians represented the bulwark of Christianity (antemuralis Christianitatis), although 
true, were not accompanied by any external assistance from other Christian powers inside 
Europe. The Austrians remained preoccupied with problems in Western Europe and 
competition with the Hungarians, leaving Croatia isolated and abandoned during its most 
crucial times32. Moreover, the consequence of Prince Eugen’s retreat from Serbia and 
Bosnia in 1689 brought a large number of Serbs to Croatian territory. Interestingly, the 
French Revolution caused a significant impact on the Croatian territories. Although the 
French rule of Croatia lasted only from 1806 to 1815, under the name of the ‘Illyrian 
Provinces’, this period was long enough to begin the process of a national awakening. Of 
further interest is the fact that current Croatian southeastern borders are similar to those 
established during the Napoleonic period. 
Following the 1815 Congress of Vienna, Austria regained territories in Croatia, 
but divided them between Vienna and Budapest. The search for a Croatian national 
identity and resistance against Germanization and Magjarization became the primary 
struggle during the 19th century. That struggle was most apparent in 1848 when the 
Croatian National Revival succeeded in the formation of foundations for the emerging 
                                                 
31 Interestingly, according to some historians, the Serbian name appeared relatively late. “As Austrian consul in 
Sarajevo, Herkalovic later stated that the first time the Serbian name became known in Bosnia was in 1862. Before that, 
those that later called themselves Serbs were called Walachians, Hrkaci, Christians, and Roma … The Serbian 
Orthodox priest Petranovic went to Bosnia with the explicit purpose to found a society that would propagate the 
Serbian name among the Orthodox in BiH. In 1866 … an Orthodox seminary was established, … [but] students spent 
more time training for guerilla warfare than studying for the priesthood.” Francis S. Eterovich and Christopher 
Spalatin, eds., Croatia: Land, People, Culture, Volume III, Croatian Franciscan Press, Chicago, IL, 1998, p. 99. 
32 In fact, every time the Ottomans were close to a major defeat, the Emperors pulled troops out of the region. 
Numerous situations such as the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) and the War of Spanish succession that caused the 
retreat of Prince Eugen of Savoy together with Serbs who feared Ottoman revenge after the Holy League (Austria, 
Poland and Venice) actually won, the Vienna War (1683-1689), the War for Austrian succession (1740-1748) and the 
Seven Years War (1756-1763) are examples of Austrian engagement on the completely opposite side of the Empire. 
The last abolishment of a campaign against the Ottomans occurred in 1790, as a consequence of the French Revolution. 
The Austrian Emperor signed a peace agreement under unfavorable conditions and gave already recaptured Croatian 
territories back to the Ottomans. More detailed explanations can be found in Vjekoslav Klaic: Povijest Hrvata (The 
History of Croats), Volume V. Nakladni Zavod Matice Hrvatske, Zagreb, 1985.  
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modern Croatian nation. 33 That same year was marked by unrest throughout the Empire, 
resulting in the resignation of Metternich, the symbol of absolutism. The first signs of 
dissatisfaction inside the multinational state also began to appear. Beside Austrian and 
Hungarian nationalisms, the idea of Russia-sponsored panslavism was introduced. At the 
same time, the Croatian ban Jelacic helped Vienna to consolidate its power in Hungary 
by participating in the crackdown on the Hungarian revolution of 1849. He hoped that the 
Croatian position inside the Empire would be enhanced, but a new deal between Vienna 
and Budapest took place, allowing absolutism to be restored again at the expense of 
Croatia.34 As a result of those many events, the Croats became more cognizant of the fact 
that only their own state could protect their best interests. 
By the mid 19th century, the Ottoman Empire was crumbling while Austria and 
Russia hoped to annex the region into their empires. That move introduced new major 
players into the region. Russia which declared herself the protector of the Slavs, and 
Britain who tried to oppose both Austrian and Russian expansion in order to protect its 
interests in the Mediterranean. The final result was the Bismarck sponsored Berlin 
Congress, which established a new order in the region with Serbia and Montenegro being 
recognized as fully independent states while Austrians would administer BiH. 
The hope that BiH, after being occupied by the Empire in 1878, would become 
part of Croatia was unrealistic because neither the Austrians nor the Hungarians wanted a 
third strong player in their power game and, also, because of a possible unification with 
the Serbs, which could endanger the very existence of the Empire. On the contrary, the 
idea of a common state of Southern Slavs was strongly supported by Russia which tried 
to broaden its influence in the only accessible area in Europe: the  ruins of the Ottoman 
Empire, which was the sick man of Europe since “the failure of the siege of Vienna in 
1683.”35 Nevertheless, during the 19th century, the situation in the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire became almost equally complicated. Nationalisms were on the rise and the state 
could not respond to all the demands. 
                                                 
33 ‘Neither with Vienna nor with Budapest’ was the slogan launched by Croatian Bishop Strossmayer. Later, that 
became the foundation for the idea of South-Slavism (Yugoslavia). Marcus Tanner, Croatia: A Nation Forged in War, 
Yale University Press, 1997, p. 94. 
34 Jill A. Irvine, The Croat Question, Westview Press, 1993, p. 23. 
35 Marcus Tanner, Croatia: A Nation Forged in War, Yale University Press, 1997, p. 52. 
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Moreover, the Emperor provoked further alienation within the empire by trying to 
appease two core nations, the Austrians and Hungarians, by giving them dominant 
positions. The Croats were especia lly boisterous in their demands for increased autonomy 
and in their resistance to ongoing Magjarization. This led to deterioration in relations and 
the 1905 formation of the block of political parties known as the ‘New Course.’ Those 
parties maintained a majority in the Parliament and strongly opposed Hungarian 
domination. They additionally sought increased cooperation with the Serbs, while 
forgetting that the Serbs continued to pursue the idea of a Greater Serbia. The Serbs were 
already preparing the basis for assimilation of the Croats. Karadzic wrote that, “those of 
the Roman Catholic Church [Croats] find it difficult to call themselves Serbs but will get 
used to it little by little, for if they do not want to be Serbs they have no other choice.”36 
During the first decade of the 20th century, other important events occurred. After 
Russia’s defeat in the war with Japan in 1904, they turned westward.37 In 1905, the 
Serbian king was murdered by a secret organization and replaced with a pro-Russian one. 
That event, along with the Young Turks movement and the Austrian annexation of BiH, 
caused tremors within the delicate equilibrium of the region. In October of 1912, the four 
Balkan countries of Greece, Serbia, Montenegro and Bulgaria attacked Turkey and after 
one month gained a complete victory. At an international conference in London in 1913, 
a compromise about the territories was reached 38, and through outside pressure, a 
separate state of Albania was created. Serbia managed to gain the Albanian province of 
Kosovo at the same conference.  
As a result of the first and second Balkan Wars, Serbia doubled its previous 
territory, further raising its appetite for becoming the leading power in the Balkans.  
Serbian expansion also caused increased conflict with almost all of its neighboring 
nations. With those events occurring in its backyard, Austria became nervous, and started 
to behave aggressively. That, along with the earlier formation of two alliances between 
the Central Powers (Germany, Austria and Italy) and the Triple Entente (France, Britain 
                                                 
36 Ibid., p. 103. 
37 Alex N. Dragnich, Serbs and Croats: The Struggle in Yugoslavia, Harcourt Brace and Company, NY, 1992, p. 
11.  
38 Since the boundaries were drawn up by the great powers, none of the Balkan countries were entirely happy, 
which created the need for a revision of the borders until recently.  
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and Russia) who backed Serbia, had resulted in the formation of highly unstable 
conditions within the region. In fact, everything was prepared for war. Just a good excuse 
was needed.    
This excuse came with the assassination of the Austrian Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand in Sarajevo 39 that opened a Pandora’s box of events by activating obligations 
derived from secret treaties among leading European powers. That successive chain of 
attacks proceeded as follows. Austria declared war on Serbia, Russia then declared war 
on Austria, Germany on Russia, France on Germany and so on. Within days of its 
commencement, World War I developed into the biggest disaster that the world had ever 
experienced. During WWI, Serbia was heavily defeated with the help of German forces 
who occupied almost the entire Balkan Peninsula. However, Serbia managed to stay on 
the right side at the right time, which became a decisive detail during the Treaty of 
Versailles.  
B. CROATIA UNDER SERBIAN DOMINATION 1918-1991 
Following the failure of the German offensive during the spring of 1918, it 
became obvious that the Austro-Hungarian Empire had come to an end. Constituent 
nations started to declare independence and the Empire disintegrated. Under the strong 
influence of President Wilson’s 14 points40, Croatia, Slovenia and BiH proclaimed the 
State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs on 29 October 1918. At the urging of Britain and 
France, talks about unification with the Serbian Kingdom began shortly thereafter in 
Geneva. “The negotiations were hard and tedious thanks to the clash of two irreconcilable 
visions of the future union – of full equality advocated by the Croats and Slovenes, and of 
Serb hegemony, as demanded by the Serbs”41. This same tone would characterize the 
common tone of the Yugoslavian state until its final dissolution in 1991. Under pressure 
from the French, Serbia signed the Geneva Accord, thereby accepting equality by 
                                                 
39 Prominent British historian Joll gives interesting opinion about that event. According to him “Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand was assassinated by a member of a group of Serbian and Croatian nationalists.” James Joll, The origins of 
the First World War, Pearson Education Limited, Second Edition, 1992, p. 10. That statement is highly problematic, 
because Serbs themselves claimed that “the assassin was a Serb … [connected] with Serbian intelligence. Alex N. 
Dragnich, Serbs and Croats: The Struggle in Yugoslavia, Harcourt Brace and Company, NY, 1992, p. 10. 
40 Point nine specified that Italy’s boundaries should be readjusted along clearly recognizable lines of nationality 
and point ten demanded that the peoples of Austro-Hungary be granted an opportunity for free autonomous 
development. Stephen Gazi, A History of Croatia, Barnes & Noble Books, 1973, p. 261. 
41 Ivo Peric, A History of the Croats, CTT, Zagreb 1998. p. 196. 
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unification.  This caused dissatisfaction within Serbia and the resignation of officials who  
signed the accord. Those resignations were later used by advocates of hegemony as a 
confirmation that “the accord was invalid, as if it had never been signed”42. Meanwhile, 
the Serbs continued to treat the former Austro-Hungarian provinces as conquered 
territories. 
Disappointment with the new state was also noticeable in Zagreb after Pribicevic, 
the leader of the Croatian Serbs, succeeded in his attempts to invite Serbian troops on to 
Croatian soil. The leader of the Croatian Peasants Party (HSS), Stjepan Radic, strongly 
opposed that policy and accused members of the Croatian delegation of naiveté and 
jeopardizing national interests. However, with help from Italy43, the Serbs succeeded in 
their desire to form a centralized kingdom under the name of the Kingdom of Serbs, 
Croats and Slovenes (SHS). Britain and France strongly supported the Serbs as rulers 
over parts of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire with the intention of blocking the 
restoration of the Empire while at same time containing Soviet expansion. 
Despite those events, the kingdom was doomed from its very inception. Five days 
after the kingdom was formed, Croatian protesters, provoked by a Serbian celebration of 
the new state, clashed with the police in Zagreb which “resulted in fifteen deaths and 
twenty wounded.”44 This would prove to be only the beginning of a series of crimes 
throughout the newly formed state. In BiH, local Serbs killed Muslims by the hundreds, 
aided by passive or active assistance from the Serbian Army. In Montenegro, an open war 
between pro-Serb and pro-Montenegrin sectarians lasted until 1923. During the following 
years, Croatian expectations regarding promises of equality within the common state 
quickly disappeared. Croatian parties were occasionally banned and their leaders  
 
                                                 
42 Ibid. 
43 Italy did poorly during the war, but later started to occupy territories along the Croatian coast promised to Italy 
by the London Agreement as compensation for joining the Triple Entente. The Italian conquest was formalized by the 
Treaty of Rapallo on 20 November 1920. A detailed description appears in Stephen Gazi, A History of Croatia, Barnes 
& Noble Books, 1973, p. 284. 
44 Ivo Peric, A History of the Croats, CTT, Zagreb 1998. p. 198 
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imprisoned. At the same time territorial reorganization carved up the Croatian territories45 
while Serbian domination overwhelmed every aspect of life.  
The dissatisfaction of the Croatian people culminated after a member of the 
Serbian radicals opened fire on Croatian leaders in their parliamentary benches, killing 
two and wounding three during a parliamentary session in June of 1928. Such an act had 
never been witnessed before in a European parliament. One of the wounded was the 
leader of the strongest Croatian party, HSS. Stjepan Radic died of his wounds a few 
weeks later. The death of Radic marked a major turn of events with even Pribicevic, the 
leader of the Croatian Serbs and a strong apologist of hegemony, turning his back on the 
idea of a Greater Serbia. Pribicevic even went as far as to accuse the King of organizing 
the assassinations.46 Croatia's rage following the incident resulted in huge demonstrations 
throughout Croatia. In January 1929, the King reacted with a royal coup, declared the 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia, seized full power, banned political parties and abolished the 
parliament. A Serbian general assumed the role of prime minister. The King abolished all 
national institutions, renamed the Serbian Army, and interestingly that name was official 
until 1929,47 and moved rapidly toward a fully centralized government. Serbian 
repression and domination within the kingdom increased. The ratio of Serbs’ 
overrepresentation was probably the most obvious in the military (161 Serbian generals, 
2 Croatian) and dip lomacy (20 Serbian ambassadors, 2 Croatian).48  The Serbs behaved 
as though the name Yugoslavia was synonymous with a Greater Serbia. Actually, that 
was the truth. Yugoslavia was the greatest Serbia ever.  
The royal coup ended a period of farcing democracy that had included 24 
different cabinets and seven prime ministers during a ten-year period.49 The royal coup 
additionally caused the emigration of Croats and Croatian politicians and the subsequent 
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formation of the illegal nationalist movement led by the radical Ustashas,50 which 
became the leading political force in Croatia during WWII. Despite the historical 
agreement between the Serbs and Croats in August of 1939, which allowed Croatian 
autonomy in territories with a predominant Croatian population, the Serbs and Croats 
were both only waiting for favorable circumstances in which to pursue their nationalistic 
agendas, and the situation in Europe by the end of 1930s was more than favorable.  
1. World War II 
Axis forces attacked Yugoslavia on 6 April 1941 following the military coup in 
Belgrade in which the Prince Regent was overthrown after having joined the Axis only a 
few days before. After only 11 days, the Yugoslav army was defeated, primarily because 
of the reluctance of non-Serbian nations to fight for the Serbian dominated state. 
Macedonia was added to Bulgaria, Kosovo to Albania, parts of Vojvodina to Hungary, 
and Slovenia was divided between Italy and Germany. Three new states were formed: 
Serbia, Montenegro and Croatia. The new Croatian state, first proclaimed in Bjelovar on 
8 April 1941, and then officially declared in Zagreb two days later,51 included the 
territory of current Croatia and BiH.  
Aside from being a puppet state under the direct control of Germany and Italy, the 
Independent State of Croatia (NDH) was generally supported by a majority of Croatians 
and Muslims52, but opposed by the Serbs. “The declaration of NDH … was greeted with 
a wave of enthusiasm in Zagreb not unlike that which had swept through the town in 
1918 when the ties with Hungary were severed.”53 However, the Ustashas regime was 
actually a dictatorship under the leadership of Pavelic who accepted the Nazi form of 
rule, including its racial laws. Ustashas killed thousands of Serbs, Gypsies, Jews and 
Croats who showed opposition to their government. The worst Ustashas crimes happened 
in a concentration camp in Jasenovac, where thousands were executed in a Nazi- like 
manner.  The Ustashas rule is definitely the worst part of Croatian history with disastrous 
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results for Croatia: division of the nation into two uncompromising ideological camps 
and the inclusion of Croatia in the list of evil dictatorships during WWII.   
The fact that a Croat named Josip Broz Tito led the communist resistance did not 
improve Croatia's post-war image. Also, it was easily overlooked that the Serbs created 
the plan for a homogenous Serbia produced by Chetniks in June 1941 where they planned 
to form a Greater Serbia at the expense of others. According to that plan, Serbs will 
illuminate others “with the Serbian spirit … [as part of] their historical mission. The 
Serbs must have hegemony in the Balkans, and to accomplish it they must first have 
hegemony in Yugoslavia.”54 After reestablishing power, the Serbs continued to spread 
propaganda, some of which became accepted by Western scholars. The Serbs were also 
far from innocent with regard to atrocities during WWII. Serbian extremists, Chetniks, 
were committing grave atrocities against Muslims and Croats in Sanjak and BiH, 55 and 
especially in Italian controlled areas of Croatia.56 Moreover, except for a short period in 
1941, there was no resistance movement in Serbia during the war. Serbia remained under 
the control of the Chetniks who collaborated with the Nazis.  
The Serbs joined forces with the Partisans following the Red Army's crossing of 
Yugoslav borders. At this point, Tito was forced to accept them because of “the aim to 
reach Belgrade before the Red Army got there … and setting up a Soviet puppet 
government. …[Partisans] did not find a single Communist Party member in Belgrade.”57 
Tito declared a state of common amnesty in 1944 when many Chetniks just changed their 
clothes and became Partisans. This explains the ease with which Serbian Partisans 
committed crimes against Croatian soldiers and civilians who had surrendered to the 
British near Bleiburg in Austria. Those civilians and prisoners of war were returned to the 
Partisans and then either killed or forced to walk from the Austrian to the Greek border, 
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which became known as the ‘Way of the Cross’. Thousands of Croats died in these 
Partisan massacres following the end of the war. The Partisan treatment of Croatian 
civilians and soldiers was quite different from the British policy toward Chetniks.  
“20,000 former Chetniks … were sent to a camp at Eboli in southern Italy. Technically 
they were ‘Surrendered Enemy Personnel’, but they were mostly looked on with 
considerable sympathy.”58  
A particularly interesting aspect of WWII was the politicization of statistics that 
took place after the war. Officially it was announced, but never documented, that the 
overall losses in Yugoslavia totaled 1.7 million people. The Croats were accused of 
killing almost more Serbs than physically inhabited the area of the NDH.  Two scholars, 
one Serb and one Croat, separately concluded that the total number of deaths was about 1 
million, which was significantly lower than official ‘statistics’. Those numbers have 
never been denied. From that number of 1 million, 307,000 Serbs and 246,000 Croats and 
Muslims were killed59 in the territory of NDH. Also, from 37,000 Jews living in NDH 
about 80 percent were killed either in Croatia or in Germany. 60 However, that was not 
enough for Serbian propaganda. They estimated the numbers to be around 50,000.61 
Although it was obvious that Ustashas were primarily responsible for the killing of the 
Serbs, the question regarding responsibility for Croatian casualties remains unanswered. 
Scholars who tried to deal with those discrepancies were accused of being nationalists 
and either imprisoned or forced into exile. Still the overall numbers refute the Serbian 
theory of being the only victim during WWII.62 It was later explained that all of those 
exaggerated numbers were a result of reparation needs. As a result, the new Serbian myth 
about (non-existent) victory in war was born, a new seed of evil had been planted, and a 
new war was waiting as a bad omen.  
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2. Communist Yugoslavia 
The new Yugoslavia was yet another example of the influence of the Great 
Powers. This time is originated from Yalta. This repeat influence of the Great Powers 
ensured that the situation for the Croatians would be similar to that of previous times. 
Although the period of Tito’s leadership was perceived idealistically from the outside, the 
actual situation inside Yugoslavia was not so wonderful. However, Tito managed to 
suppress tensions among nations and avoid conflict. A new constitution defined 
Yugoslavia as a federal state consisting of the six republics of Slovenia, Croatia, BiH, 
Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia. The republics were allowed formal autonomy. 
Additionally, Kosovo and Vojvodina were given autonomy within Serbia. In contrast, the 
communist party remained the only choice during elections, although this did not prevent 
Western support of Tito's regime. Tito's 1948 break with Stalin, the 1949 cessation of 
assistance to communists in Greece, Stalin’s death in 1953, and the 1954 agreement 
about Trieste all bolstered Western support for his regime.  
During the next few decades, Tito successfully exploited an uneasy balance 
between two antagonistic blocs. Tito managed to receive significant economic help from 
the West, while at the same time maintaining close contact with the East. During the 
1960s, the economic situation in Yugoslavia deteriorated to the point where the usual 
economic aid from the West was not enough. This forced Tito to open Yugoslavia’s 
borders with the West and allowed hundreds of thousands of guest workers 
(gastarbeiters) to seek work in Germany. By 1973 “about 1.1 million workers and 
dependants were living outside Yugoslavia’s borders”, and half of them were Croats, but 
by 1981 “a 40 percent drop in the number of reported Croatian guest workers caused 
speculations that many Croats were adopting permanent foreign residency.”63  This 
brought the question of why so many Croatians chose to emigrate when they were second 
in economic strength only to Slovenia. To address this phenomenon the political and 
economic relations among the republics must be further explored. 
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The introduction of a mixture of communist-style economics with some elements 
of capitalism during the 1960s caused a weakening of the overall communist grip in 
Yugoslavia. The state remained centralized and highly bureaucratized with an 
overrepresentation of Serbs in state administrations and the military. Slovenia and 
Croatia, although having a combined population of 6.5 million of the total population of 
22.5 million, contributed more than 50 percent 64 of the federal budget, which in turn, had 
very little influence on fiscal expenditures within the government. Money was officially 
spent on projects in underdeveloped parts of the country such as Kosovo, Macedonia and 
Montenegro, with an overbearing influence from Belgrade.65 The amount of money that 
‘disappeared’ for use on military, federal, and Serbian projects during these years remains 
a mystery.  
Those events coupled with constant Serbian pressure for even stronger 
centralization and unification caused discontent between the intellectual and ruling elites 
in Croatia. Their discontent culminated in the 1971 movement known as the Croatian 
Spring. 66 Tito suppressed this movement by putting Croatian political leaders under 
house arrest, and intellectuals in prison.  
When they fell, an entire generation that included the majority of the most 
talented people in Croatia went to prison or into exile, or was forced into 
obscurity. In the place of that generation came time-servers, police spies 
and nonentities whose main talent was often a proven ability to spy or 
denounce their colleagues.67  
The consequences of the Croatian Spring created the new political term ‘Croatian 
silence,’ or quiet resistance, that characterized the Croats’ behavior during the following 
period. Moreover, the Croats continued to leave the communist party. “By 1981 … Serbs 
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made up 47 percent of the Party … [while] only 14 percent … were Croats.”68 However, 
the result was the 1974 Constitution that granted the republics more independence from 
Belgrade and confirmed the republic's rights to self-determination, including separation. 
Somehow, Tito and his  closest partner Kardelj, had anticipated forthcoming events, and 
had unwillingly opened the door for the future independence of the republics. 
During the 1970s, Yugoslavia's economic situation continued to worsen as a 
result of the oil crises and policy of détente. Yugoslavia's foreign debt rose from $2 
billion in the beginning of the 1970s to $18 billion by the beginning of the 1980s.69 The 
main reason for Yugoslavia's ballooning debt was its unrealistic investments in non-
profitable political projects such as the railroad Belgrade-Bar. Yugoslavia's financial 
spiral was further exacerbated by huge military expenditures of about 50 percent of the 
federal budget along with an unparalleled appetite for weapons. Tito's death in May of 
1980 left a country in economic chaos. Complicated interrelations among the republics 
coupled with an uncontrollable military further deepened the political instability within 
the country. This set the stage for a period of increasing turmoil within Yugoslavia where 
the eight-headed collective federal presidency would rapidly unravel as the world 
watched. 
3. Turmoil during the 1980s 
On one side of Yugoslavia, Croatia and Slovenia wanted more Western- like 
development with mutual political ties similar to those of the EC. On the other side, 
Serbia did not want to lose its central position of authority, which would result in the loss 
of the ability to manipulate the common policy and economic structure. Unfavorable 
circumstances had once again fallen into place and the players watched carefully as the 
last remnants of Yugoslavia began to unravel. During riots in Kosovo in April 1981, the 
Albanian minority demanded full equality with the other nationalities and also raised the 
question of the prospect of a separate republic within Yugoslavia. The initial reaction of 
Serbian and federal authorities was harsh but, during the time, other members of the 
crumbling federation became increasingly reluctant to participate in the events in 
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Kosovo. The situation undulated back and forth until 1986 when the Serbian Academy of 
Arts and Sciences (SANU) published its notorious Memorandum, and an ambitious new 
leader appeared on the scene in the form of Slobodon Milosevic.  
The Memorandum was produced by prominent Serbian academicians and was 
immediately accepted as the new foundation for the newest wave of emerging Serbian 
nationalism. The vocabulary hidden behind expressed concern for the future of the 
Serbian nation actually represented a call for revenge against Albanians and Croats.  
Croatia was accused of being similar to the NDH and of jeopardizing the lives of Serbs 
within its territory. “But for the period of the existence of the NDH, Serbs in Croatia have 
never been as threatened as they are nowadays.”70 This was hardly the case since 11.5 
percent of Serbs living within Croatia occupied more than a third of the prestigious 
positions along with an even larger share of military positions.71 Moreover, even the 
leader of the Croatian communist party was a Serb.  
The famous words “no one should dare to beat you”72 promoted Milosevic as the 
new central figure of Serbian politics. This now famous statement paved the way for his 
absolute rule of Serbia for more than a decade. Unlike Gorbachev who tried to 
democratize the Soviet Union, Milosevic promoted a strange (or normal) mixture of 
communism and extreme nationalism, which became the dominant and identifiable 
characteristic of the Serbian state. This rise of nationalism started with mass rallies all 
over Serbia, Vojvodina, Kosovo and Montenegro during 1988.  The grand finale occurred 
on 28 June 1989, the 600th anniversary of the Kosovo Battle where Milosevic said, “Six 
centuries later, again we are in battles and quarrels. They are not armed battles, though 
such things should not be excluded yet.”73  
By his use of mass rallies and demonstrations, Milosevic succeeded in ending the 
autonomous status of both Kosovo and Vojvodina, but took their votes within the 
collective presidency. Milosevic was also successful in the establishment of a pro-Serbian 
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government in Montenegro.  This would assure Milosevic four out of eight votes within 
the collective presidency, but he would require one more to realize his ambitions of 
ruling Yugoslavia.  
The rest of the country was scared and almost hypnotized with the speed of 
Milosevic’s success, particularly after the announcement that the Serbs were ready to use 
all institutional and non- institutional methods to achieve their goals. This served as an 
open threat causing all parties to seek protection against the threat of Serbian aggression.  
Croatia and Slovenia expected that they would receive support from the democratic West.  
These expectations were bolstered with the fall of the Berlin Wall in October of 1989 and 
further strengthened by the wave of democratization that spread across Central Europe.  
An additional reason for optimism was the destiny of Ceaucescu in Romania. By the end 
of 1989, it seemed apparent that communism could not resist the onslaught of emerging 
changes. The logical sequence of events would seem to be the replacement of 
communists in Serbia with a more democratically oriented leadership that would allow a 
peaceful settlement to the rapidly deteriorating situation. 
In reaction to these imminent changes, the Croatian communist party allowed the 
formation of new political parties. During the second half of 1989, a large number of 
political parties were created bringing a revival to the political scene and an almost 
surrealistic feeling of liberty and freedom of expression. The picture of political life was 
colored with a broad diapason of ideas ranging from that of an asymmetric federation to a 
more loose confederation with the rest of Yugoslavia.74 Others argued for independence 
within the current borders and even restoration of the old medieval Kingdom. Despite the 
broad range of political ideologies, nobody within Croatian ever predicted the 
forthcoming conflict with Serbia, or the disastrous war that would devastate Croatia and 
BiH.  
Milosevic became keenly aware of the shape of things to come when both the  
Slovenians and Croatians walked out of the January 1990 Conference of the Communist 
Party. The Croats and Slovenes did so following a barrage of criticism from the Serbian 
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block. Milosevic did not feel that he needed the cooperation of the Slovenes or Croats 
since he was confident after his recent galvanization of Serbian opinion over the question 
of Kosovo. He also had found a new ally in the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA), which 
further solidified his confidence in victory. The JNA joined Milosevic not only because 
of the vast majority of Serbs of which it was comprised, but also because with the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia, the JNA had lost its employer, and raison d’être. More 
specifically, the Serbs were not all that concerned about the loss of Slovenia. Their true 
belief was that with Slovenia out of the way, Croatia would be easier prey. Nevertheless, 
January of 1990 marked the beginning of the end of the common state. While others tried 
to democratize and organize the first free elections since WWII, the Serbs started, with 
the assistance of JNA, to draw future maps75 illustrating which part of what country 
would be taken and when. It was obvious that there was no clash between nationalistic 
options. Instead, there was a clash between communistic-nationalistic and democratic 
ideas, between hegemony and federalism, and between the past and the future. The future 
that Croatia expected would be in Western security and economic integration.  
C. HOMELAND WAR AND CROATIAN INDEPENDENCE 
The first free elections in the former Yugoslavia were held in Slovenia in April of 
1990, and were followed by elections in Croatia. Similar to post Cold War elections in 
other ex-communist countries, the communist party was heavily defeated, and a new 
democratic government was elected. Unlike other parties which did not offer a clear 
perspective for the future or may have been perceived as too radical, the Croatian 
Democratic Union (HDZ), led by Franjo Tudjman, presented a relatively clear platform 
with regard to possible independence. It is apparent that the HDZ moderate position and 
focus on Croatian independence was key to their success during the elections. The 
Serbian frenzied campaign of accusing all Croats of being Ustashas also contributed to 
the HDZ victory. Their charges of a Croatian genocidal nature created feelings of 
humiliation and frustration among Croats. Indecisiveness of other politicians coupled 
with their failure to assume a clear position with regards to Milosevic’s demands also 
hurt some Croatian candidates. Yet another factor leading to the HDZ victory was 
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Milosevic’s aggressive and perfectly orchestrated rallies throughout Serbian areas of 
Croatia which provoked more and more tension.  
After winning elections in Croatia, the HDZ automatically received the right to 
send a representative to the federal presidency. Their choice was Stjepan Mesic, the 
current Croatian President. Although the federal presidency played only a formal role, 
there were still some expectations that through it a worse case scenario might be avoided. 
Those hopes arose following economic reforms under Premier Markovic who had 
achieved excellent results. However, to the Serbs, the mere presence of an elected non-
communist member of the rotating presidency was offensive, mostly because of the 
pending Croatian turn to assume its one-year top position in 1991.76 Serbian reaction 
came rapidly. Following the idea that Serbia existed anywhere that Serbs lived, Croatian 
Serbs blocked the main highways and railroads halfway between Zagreb and the 
Dalmatian coast on the 17th of August 1990. By no accident, this occurred in the middle 
of the tourist season and caused enormous losses to the Croatian economy. That event 
also made it clear that the new Croatian government had spent most of its time 
celebrating an electoral victory when it should have been preparing the country for the 
disaster that was approaching from the east.  
As a result of the Serbian elections in December 1990, which Milosevic’s 
communists decisively won, Milosevic was allowed to eliminate his next obstacle or the 
very popular Premier Markovic. The plan was simple. Serbia stole $1.8 billion from the 
National Bank,77 which effectively eradicated all economic results achieved during that 
year and further deepened the gap between Serbia and the other republics. In response, 
Slovenia held a referendum in which the Slovenes voted for possible independence and 
Croatia adopted a new Constitution on 22 December 1990, which opened the door for its 
potential independence. The last attempt to facilitate Serbian domination occurred in 
January 1991 when exceptionally harsh pressure was put on the BiH member of the 
presidency. Mr. Bogicevic was a Serb who could guarantee the 5:3 ratio in favor of using 
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the JNA against Croatia and Slovenia which would be required during voting. He 
refused. 
1. Initial Stages of Homeland War 
Croatian Serbs, living in the already self- isolated Krajina region, declared 
independence from Croatia on the 15th of March 1991.78 The following day Milosevic 
announced that ‘Yugoslavia is finished’ and that Serbia would no longer respect the 
federal authority of Yugoslavia. In effect, Serbia had seceded from Yugoslavia well 
before the Croats and Slovenes were to declare their independence.79 Encouraged by that 
turn of events, the Serbs in the Krajina region started to behave in an aggressive manner. 
They first blocked all forms of communication, and then began expelling non-Serbs from 
the area. Attacks on police forces happened first in Pakrac, Plitvice during March, and 
than in Borovo Selo where on 2 May 1991 twelve Croatian policemen were killed. This 
was the first massacre to occur in Croatia. Most of the policemen had had their eyes 
gouged out which was to become an omen of future activities that would take place in 
Croatia, and sent a clear message to anybody opposed to the idea of a Greater Serbia.  
The chain of events that ensued was catastrophic. The Serbs first refused to accept 
the Croatian member of the presidency as primus inter pares, while an overwhelming 
majority supported the Croatian referendum for independence80. The JNA then switched 
from a position of faking neutrality to open support of the Serbs. US Secretary of State 
James Baker visited Yugoslavia in an attempt to find some resolution to the rapidly 
escalating situation, but failed to do so. His Pythian diplomatic sentences were accepted 
as the green light, or at a minimum, not a deterrent to Serbian action, and the way for 
unbridled aggression was opened.  
Croatia and Slovenia both declared full independence on 25 June 1991 without 
support from either European countries or the US. However, while Slovenia was 
thoroughly prepared, the Croatian authorities were strong in rhetoric and weak in 
practicalities. The Croatian leadership was completely unprepared for the possible 
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implications of their declaration of independence. Two days later after the declaration of 
independence, the JNA simulated an attack on Slovenia,81 while in fact pulling out 
troops, and concentrating them for assaults on Croatia. However, the Croatian leadership 
remained preoccupied with the internal trivia, such as the development of state emblems 
and the Presidential insignia. In doing so, Croatia missed the opportunity to develop a 
broad international support for Croatian independence. Instead, it promoted a picture of a 
small xenophobic nation, which was exactly what the opponents of Croatian 
independence wanted. 
During the summer of 1991, fighting erupted throughout Croatia bringing with it 
casualties, and an increasing number of refugees expelled from their homes by the 
Serbian military, paramilitary and local militia forces. Croatian authorities, caught 
unprepared, tried to arm police forces and to form military units82, while at the same time 
maneuvering at the diplomatic level. During those first few months, the Croatian 
population began to learn the real meaning of the words international politics, political 
realism, political pragmatism, great powers, the UN Security Council, international 
community, balance of power, humanitarian aid, and so on. Moreover, the UN Security 
Council imposed an unselective arms embargo upon all of Yugoslavia in September and 
left current and future victims of Serbian aggression virtually disarmed. Consequently, 
until the autumn of 1991, almost one third of Croatia remained under Serbian control 
despite the fact that less than half of the 532,00083 Croatian Serbs lived in that area. 
However, the defensive character of the war, the bravery of Croatian soldiers, and the 
patriotism of its citizens compensated for the lack of military knowledge and very 
obvious lack of any strategic vision by political leaders.   
A new term, ‘ethnic cleansing’ surfaced during the war in Croatia, marking the 
way in which the Serbs tried to achieve their objective of a Greater Serbia. Before the 
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eyes of the international community, thousands were killed and massacred and hundreds 
of thousands became refugees simply because they were not Serbs. The city of Vukovar 
fell following a heroic defense and its reduction to rubble during three months of the 
siege.84 Perhaps the worst scene in the war in Croatia took place in Vukovar when 
drunken Chetniks marched among the ruins and dead bodies, celebrating victory and 
singing, “Slobodan [Milosevic] bring the salad, there will be meat, we’re slaughtering the 
Croats.”85 Massacres against wounded soldiers and civilians only strengthened the 
Croatian determination to resist at any cost. During the autumn of 1991, the front lines 
were mostly stabilized, and despite the fall of Vukovar, a counteroffensive in Western 
Slavonia brought the first success to the young Croatian Army. Bearing in mind that the 
Croats fought under extremely unfavorable conditions such as the lack of weapons, 
ammunition, organization, uniforms, and above all international support, the very 
survival of the state was thought to be impossible, and their success on the frontlines was 
nothing short of a miracle. 
The Homeland War, in spite of bringing suffering and misery to the Croatian 
people, proved to be an epic of courage that made international recognition of the 
Republic of Croatia possible. International recognition of Croatia was announced during 
the EC ministerial summit on 16 December 1991.86 Formal recognition followed on 15 
January 1992 along with the introduction of UN troops to Croatian territory. These events 
facilitated Milosevic’s exit strategy by partitioning one quarter of Croatia with UN 
troops, and allowing him to shift his center of gravity to BiH. He probably believed that 
once the partition had taken place, as in Cyprus, history would make it permanent. The 
aggression on BiH that began in April of 1992 immediately shed light on even worse 
atrocities than those committed in Croatia. These atrocities included Nazi- like 
concentration camps, and ethnic cleansing on larger scale than had been perpetrated in 
Croatia, which ultimately resulted in genocide.  
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After the liberation of Dubrovnik in summer 1992, one quarter of Croatia 
remained occupied for the next three years. This occupation further caused Croatia’s 
shattered economy to deteriorate. The massive and increasing number of refugees 
arriving from neighboring BiH further contributed to the unbearable conditions in 
Croatia. At the end of 1992 there were about 700,000 refugees in Croatia87 which resulted 
in enormous pressure on its weak economy. Such an immense number of refugees caused 
unsolvable humanitarian problems, but also endangered social and economic stability. 
Unable to ensure enough housing, the government housed refugees in tourist facilities 
which resulted in their devastation and long term consequences for tourism.  
2. War Moves to Bosnia – 1992-1993 
Serbian aggression also produced extremely complicated circumstances in BiH.  
The BiH authorities, counting on international help and the prevention of Serbian attacks, 
did not prepare the population for the horrific scenario that followed. Caught totally off 
guard, disarmed, and abandoned by the international community, Muslim leaders tried to 
organize some form of resistance, but the Serb advance was so rapid that there was not 
enough time for an appropriate response. The Muslim leader Izetbegovic unintentionally 
contributed to the tragedy in BiH88 by hoping that the world would remember what the 
Serbs had done in Croatia. He hoped that international recognition of BiH would also 
bring international protection. 89 His hopes were shattered when the news of Serbian 
massacres in eastern BiH broke, along with waves of refugees, first from Eastern BiH, 
and then from all parts where the Serbs tried to enforce their policy of a Greater Serbia.   
After the UN imposed an economic embargo on the remainder of Yugoslavia 
(Resolution 757, on 30 May 1992)90, it appeared that the Serbs would be denied their 
attempts to seize territories and to expel Muslims and Croats. Numerous statements given 
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by various officials led to this conclusion. However, impressive speeches, promising 
statements and an economic embargo did not prevent Serbian continued aggression, and 
the realities of everyday life in BiH went from bad to worse. The Serbs ignored this 
international isolation and continued with their campaign of ethnic cleansing and the 
broadening of Serbian controlled areas in BiH.  
In August 1992, the world was shocked by evidence that the Serbs had held 
Muslims and Croats in concentration camps. These atrocities, although widely known 
throughout Croatia and BiH, were confirmed worldwide along with the mistreatment of 
civilians, expulsion, robbery, the rape of women and children and the execution or mass 
condemnation of men to concentration camps. Most disturbing was that these atrocities, 
unknown in Europe since the demise of the Nazis, were planned and organized by 
authorities in Serbia in concert with academics in top positions among BiH Serbs.  Such 
an open ignorance of international rules and norms disallows any excuse for those who 
tried to balance culpability and pretended to be misinformed. 
Of course, Croatian fronts were also active during 1992. This was especially true 
near Dubrovnik, where the Croatian Army liberated the city, and helped Croats and 
Muslims defend their territories in BiH. Military cooperation between Croatia and BiH 
was officially confirmed by the “Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation” signed by 
Tudjman and Izetbegovic on 22 July in Zagreb91. Although it was not clear who was 
supposed to defend BiH, Croatia was accused for having troops inside the country's 
borders. Paradoxically, during a period of the worst Serbian atrocities against Muslims, 
an international campaign was launched against Croatia for its actions in BiH. These 
phenomena clearly illustrated the worst problem for Croatia which was the lack of 
powerful allies, and worse still, the willingness of the international community to appease 
the Serbs in spite of their unspeakable crimes.  
A new problem emerged as a consequence of the Serbian conquest. The Muslim 
and Croat populations were squeezed into less than 30 percent of the BiH territory. 
Sparks were ignited as a general feeling of distrust overtook the BiH Croats and Muslims 
and the two former allies waged war for territories that remained unoccupied. This suited 
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well the interests of many of the parties involved and especially politicians who refused 
to help BiH under the premise of ancient hatreds. Croats and Muslims, the primary 
victims of Serbian aggression in BiH, fought each other for the few square kilometers of 
arid land instead of combining their efforts against the Serbs. This fighting destroyed 
their mutual alliance which was their only hope for success in war and “caused a certain 
grim satisfaction among pro-Serb circles in France and Britain.”92. However, when the 
situation became unbearable, a new powerful player emerged in the region – the US. 
With the commencement of US engagement in the conflict came new hope for the 
agonized population. 
3. End of War 
As a consequence of US engagement in the region, suddenly everything changed 
for Croatia. In February of 1994 the Croat-Muslim Federation was formed. That crucial 
alliance stopped the fighting between BiH Croats and Muslims and allowed a period of 
rebuilding mutual trust.93 Although it began to appear that the tide had turned for the new 
federation, it took an entire year for final victory over Serb aggression to occur. Serbian 
unwillingness to accept any proposal of the now US led international community meant 
that the Serbs had to be defeated militarily. At the same time, however, the countries 
engaged in peacekeeping operations were not willing to suffer casualties in any potential 
fight against the Serbs. This created a paradoxical situation. Everybody wanted to have a 
say or, at least, some influence in ending the BiH crisis, but no country was willing to 
accept casualties as a price for their commitment.  
The solution to that challenge was found in an unprecedented and interesting way. 
The Croatian Army was, in effect, employed as a NATO ground force. However, Croatia 
needed military assistance which came in an advisory form through the US company 
Military Professional Resources Inc. (MPRI), along with heavy armaments from the 
black market. After almost a year of preparations, the Croatian Army struck three times 
during 1995. Operation ‘Flash’ on May 1 was more like a rehearsal for Operation 
‘Storm’, which took place on August 4. During that operation, the Croatian Army 
liberated significant parts of occupied Croatian territory, along with the Bihac pocket, a 
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UN ‘safe area’ in BiH. “Predictably, Britain, France and Russia condemned the entire 
operation. But Germany and the US did not.”94 Croatian Forces then struck a third time in 
concert with the BiH 5th Corps. This highly successful operation liberated more than 20 
percent of BiH territory, while achieving a fifty-fifty ratio of controlled territory. This 
was exactly what the international community and the US wanted to stabilize the 
situation in BiH. Still at issue with regard to these highly successful campaigns are 
questions about the alleged removal of the Serbian population from Croatia and BiH 
during these operations.  
The war was finally ended by a peace agreement negotiated in Dayton, Ohio in 
November, and then signed in Paris in December of 1995. The Dayton Agreement was 
more an attempt to stop the war at any cost than any durable plan for the region’s future.  
Although celebrated as a Croatian diplomatic victory, the Dayton Agreement brought to 
Croatia numerous obligations with few benefits. Most insulting to the Croatian people 
was to be treated similarly to the Serbs who caused the wars and misery in the region.  
Consequently, the implementation of the Dayton Agreement is slow and results are 
mixed.  
4. Period from 1996-1999 
President Franjo Tudjman deserves much of the credit for Croatian independence 
and the achievement of the ‘thousand years old dream’ about Croatian sovereignty. 
During the initial years of his rule, especially in 1991, he formed the Government of 
National Unity along with calling for increased dialog between descendants of Ustashas 
and Partisans. His actions showed a sense of compromise and the necessity of national 
consensus. Additionally, his contribution to the strengthening of the Croatian position in 
the region is truly remarkable. “He was a strong leader during difficult times,” says 
Slobodan Lang, President Tudjman's adviser on humanitarian affairs. “Times when 
Europe lacked vision.”95 Aside from his many achievements, Tudjman probably forgot 
that “even the ultimate outcome of war is not always to be regarded as final.”96 The 
second part of his leadership was characterized by numerous mistakes both in 
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international relations and internal affairs which led to Croatia's semi- isolation along with 
an impediment to its access to Euro-Atlantic integration. Worse still was the reversing 
process of democratization inside the country coupled with the near-collapse of the 
country’s economy. With little affinity for nuances, President Tudjman identified himself 
with the nation that as time passed turned into authoritarianism and an attitude that 
everything good for him was automatically good for Croatia. Surrounded by a camarilla 
of advisors who always agreed with him and fed his (un)justified fears about an 
international complot against Croatia, Tudjman created an enormous gap between 
himself and the people of Croatia. Later, when he became seriously ill, Croatia was 
practically paralyzed because nobody could make a decision without his approval.   
The lack of democratic transformation and serious mistakes in privatization 
marked the last few years of Tudjman’s presidency. His style of ruling was definitely 
incompatible with the Zeitgeist in Europe (failure to understand ‘end of history’), and had 
placed Croatia in an extremely difficult international position. Of equal importance was 
the way in which the economic transition had been conducted and remained one of the 
worst periods of early medieval capitalism. Further worsening the situation, state 
enterprises were distributed along political and party lines to new entrepreneurs who were 
then obligated to finance HDZ moguls. Moreover, undefined amounts of money were 
carried out of the country for private and party purposes, producing widespread 
dissatisfaction with the government. Those factors, along with the drain of national 
wealth and resources involved with financing the HDZ in BiH, resulted in a rapidly 
growing indebtedness and an overall decrease in the standard of living. Croatia became 
dangerously close to the type of government usually called a mafiocracy.  
Croatia's position within the international community deteriorated at a similar 
tempo. Western institutions wanted nothing to do with Tudjman’s regime, mostly 
because he refused to accept dictates and requests from Western powers. As a result of its 
increasing alienation from the European mainstream, Croatia missed an opportunity to 
join PfP. Consequently, it missed the 1999 Madrid summit, and with it the chance to 
become one of the Membership Action Plan (MAP) countries. Croatia's relationship with 
the EU was even worse. This could be attributed to Tudjman's refusal of Croatian 
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membership in the Central European Free Trade Association (CEFTA) in 1992. His 
explanation was that Croatia would join the EU directly although this never came to 
fruition. Even worse, the EU cancelled all negotiations after Croatia started to liberate its 
territories in 1995. Consequently, Croatia's only hope was its still promising relationship 
with the US, the only important country that continuously encouraged democratic 
changes and offered optimism for the future of Croatia.  
The death of the first Croatian President in December 1999 was accepted with 
some sort of relief from the population after so many years of sharing his best and worst 
hours. Tudjman's death also marked the beginning of a new era in Croatian politics that 
definitely would be different, if not better, than the era of Tudjman. However, instead of 
leaving behind a consolidated democracy, he left a nation divided, without any 
sustainable strategy or a comprehensive plan for the future development of the country. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Aside from the medieval Kingdom, the Croats spent almost nine centuries living 
in common statehood with Hungary, Austria and Serbia. During most of this time, others 
dominated the Croats and decisions about Croatian faith were made in Budapest, Vienna 
or Belgrade. Although unpleasant, the life in the Austro-Hungarian Empire kept Croatia 
constantly connected with Mitteleuropa and the West which, along with Catholicism, 
formed a specific cultural and political identity. However, Croatia suffered mostly 
because of being a borderland, which often included the fate “to be buffeted in one 
direction or the other, to be trampled on, crossed over, colonized, defended and 
abandoned in turn of stronger neighboring powers.”97 The formation of a common state 
with Serbia and Slovenia brought the challenge of being assimilated by aggressive 
Serbian nationalism that characterized both pre- and post-WWII Yugoslavia to Croatia.  
In order to contain Germany, the British, French and Russians supported the idea 
of Yugoslavia under Serbian domination, which fueled the constant conflict between 
Serbian hegemonism and Croatian federalism, and produced almost unsolvable problems 
for Croatia in achieving independence. Additionally, communist rule and the strategic 
position of Yugoslavia during the Cold War prevented Croatia from undertaking any 
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significant step towards independence. After the end of the Cold War, all circumstances 
for the dissolution of Yugoslavia were met. The process of disintegration was the logical 
consequence of numerous “differences in the level of economic development, 
demographic movements, ethnic structure, civilization and cultural levels, tradition, 
habits, psychology, and outlook,”98 of the Yugoslavia’s nations. However, Croatia’s 
attempt to become independent was not accepted with enthusiasm by powerful members 
of the international community which resulted in the ordeal that Croatia had to suffer. 
This lack of international support for Croatia bolstered the Serbian desire for more 
territories and the continuation of the Greater Serbia policy and the strategy of ethnic 
cleansing that culminated in thousands killed and the destruction of Croatia’s economy.  
The aftermath of the war is still reflected not only in Croatia’s economic situation, 
but also politically, both in domestic and international realms. Despite Croatian 
cooperation with the West during the BiH crisis and the fact that Croatia needs the West 
and vice versa, mutual distrust prevails by producing paradoxical circumstances where 
neither side was satisfied with the existing arrangement but at the same time was 
incapable of changing the unfavorable status quo. Thus, during the second half of the 
1990s, Croatia remained “on the outside of Europe looking in, perched uncomfortably 
where it had been so often in its embattled and tragic past, on the ramparts of 
Christianity.”99 However, the positive developments, once started in Croatia and Europe 
with the fall of the Berlin Wall, continue to advance through the Euro-Atlantic integration 
processes by closing the previous gap and offering a more promising future. 
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III. NATO – FROM THE BEGINNING TO ITS REINVENTION 
The Parties [NATO members] are resolved to unite their efforts for 
collective defense and for preservation of peace and security. 100 
The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European state 
in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the 
security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. 101 
A synopsis of Croatian history would not be complete without a discussion of the 
circumstances that shaped European relations during the second half of the 20th century.  
This would be impossible without presenting the evidence for the need for the creation of 
a US backed NATO Alliance and its position as the main pillar of European security after 
WWII. That, along with direct and indirect US influence on European security, has 
always been of crucial importance not only for Western European countries, but also for 
CEE countries that have waited for decades for the opportunity to escape the oppression 
of communism. Croatia maintained similar aspirations by the end of the 1980s, but 
unfavorable circumstances during the 1990s hindered its ability to move forward toward 
Western integration until just recently.  
Since its inception in 1949, the NATO Alliance offers a unique opportunity for 
promoting peace, stability and friendly relations throughout the North-Atlantic area. In 
addition, NATO guaranteed protection to the member states from a possible Soviet threat. 
During this time, and under strong US influence, NATO became the most important 
instrument for trans-Atlantic cooperation in political, military and economic fields. 
However, the end of the Cold War shook the Alliance and raised the basic questions of 
European security and the necessity of a NATO existence under new circumstances. The  
crisis in the former Yugoslavia and the inefficiency of other collective security 
mechanisms, especially European ones, proved the necessity of NATO’s existence. 
Moreover, the only way out of this complicated situation that caused the biggest 
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challenge to European security since WWII was the US-led NATO engagement. The US 
attempt to turn “a major security issue entirely over to the Europeans”102 resulted in the 
clear demonstration of Europe’s inability of rising to such a demanding task.   
A similar situation happened with the process of NATO enlargement where 
mutual suspicions and frictions prevented the Europeans from taking a more affirmative 
approach. Again, US leadership was needed for NATO enlargement during the 1990s. 
However, the NATO enlargement, along with the NATO sponsored Partnership for Peace 
(PfP) program, visibly improved European security, and contributed to the stabilization 
of existing and potential crisis areas. That stabilization released all fears and suspicions 
about the possible negative repercussions of such activities, and brought a sense of 
security to smaller European nations along with the harmonization of mutual relations. 
Croatia’s relationship with NATO, although currently at an all time high, needs to 
be addressed from various perspectives. Above all, several NATO countries strongly 
rejected the idea of Croatian independence, which later affected attempts at building 
mutual trust. Also, since NATO per se did not become directly engaged in the crisis in 
Yugoslavia until 1993, Croatia’s relations with NATO are best observed through the 
prism of the relationship between Croatia and individual NATO members instead of the 
Alliance as a whole. This is especially important to note because some of the NATO 
members’ dubious approach to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, particularly in BiH, 
decisively influenced NATO’s relationship with Croatia. However, even when Croatia 
became an NATO ally in BiH, suspicions from the West did not completely disappear 
along with stereotypes about Croatia, which continuously complicated Croatia's relations 
with Western states. 
A. NATO IN THE COLD WAR 
The period after the end of WWII, similar to tremors following an earthquake, 
was full of trembling and turmoil that lasted into the mid 1950s.  The ultimate challenge 
for all countries, and the Europeans in particular, was the search for a reliable security 
mechanism for avoiding future socio-political disasters of WWII proportion. Despite the 
creation of the UN as a collective security mechanism and some sort of Great Powers 
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directorate,103 the questions of individual and collective defense remained open. The 
situation in Europe after the end of WWII was characterized by an overall decline in the 
importance of European powers, along with the shift of gravity centers towards either the 
US or the Soviet Union. The combined economic and military strength of the great 
European powers had been drastically diminished as in the case of Britain and France, or 
totally removed as in the case of Germany and Italy. This resulted in a loss of their 
significance within the confines of the newly established world order as defined at Yalta.  
The US, now the leading world power, did not have the luxury of walking away 
from Europe as it had after WWI. To do so would allow the trans fer of its dominant 
position to the Soviets.104 The US realized that the only way to stop Soviet expansion and 
at the same time assist with the recovery of Western Europe would be the establishment 
of a military alliance. Such an alliance would ensure the continuity of a US presence 
along with the protection of Europe based on commonly shared democratic values and 
interests. Considering this, “Lord Ismay, the first Secretary-General of NATO, argued 
that NATO’s aim was to keep Russians out, the Germans down and the Americans in,”105 
It took until 1948 for Western Europeans to realize the necessity of this project.  
Disillusionment with Soviet style rule in the CEE was apparent (Berlin, Czechoslovakia). 
The potential of German danger became minute in comparison with the looming 
communist threat. The newly formed Western Union106 of the UK, France and the 
Benelux did not appear to match the challenge of the rapidly strengthening Soviets.  
Additionally, the economic aftermath of war remained evident, and may have been 
unsolvable without the US sponsored Marshall Plan. These tenants formed the foundation 
of the common US-Western European alliance that would thrive during the second half 
of the 20th century. That Alliance succeeded in solving the European Question for half a 
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century. “For Americans, by and large, that question has been how to protect the rest of 
the world from Europe’s destructiveness, if not necessarily to save Europe from itself.”107 
The need for a constant US presence in Europe was confirmed by events in 
Greece and Turkey during the late 1940s. It became evident that Britain could not bear 
the required financial burden of stabilization in the region alone.108 With the 
announcement of the Truman Doctrine, Britain was systematically pushed aside by the 
new leader of the Western world – the US. This was a sort of a continuation of 
Roosevelt’s idea of “retirement of Europe from world politics”109 along with the 
inauguration of the US as the global power. Although this policy seemed contradictory to 
Monroe’s hemispherism, the policy in fact served to supplement hemispherism on the 
broader world stage, with an emphasis on Europe. It became evident that Western Europe 
could not function without strong economical and military assistance from the US. The 
US government in turn seemed willing to push for a formal treaty. Following successes in 
winning the domestic fight against isolationists who were opposed to Article V, the last 
obstacle to the NATO treaty had been removed. The North Atlantic Treaty was signed on 
4 April 1949 by 12 initial members: the US, UK, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, Canada, Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Portugal and Italy.110  
Creation of such a powerful alliance during peacetime changed the balance of 
power in Europe dramatically. The Soviet Union, which had previously faced only one 
opponent at a time, now faced a compact block of countries determined to oppose any 
further provocation. The Austrian settlement in 1951, NATO admittance of Greece and 
Turkey in 1952, a solution to the problem of Trieste in 1954, the entry of West Germany 
in NATO in 1955, followed by the formation of the Warsaw Pact created the newest lines 
of partition in Europe. On one side the Soviets controlled the entire CEE, while the West 
contained these Soviet block nations by controlling all access to the sea. Only a few 
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neutral states remained, along with Yugoslavia, that was split fifty-fifty at Yalta, and it 
remained the stumbling block of European security until recently. 
This was how Europe and the rest of the World became hopelessly divided 
between two uncompromising political, economic and military blocks. Under such 
circumstances, rivalry over Europe started and increased during that period, in time 
becoming the worst threat that the world had ever faced: the threat of mutual destruction 
by the use of nuclear weapons. An appropriate term for this stalemate situation was 
quickly developed - The Cold War. The Cold War became “a descriptive term that was 
generally adopted to characterize the hostile relationship that developed between the 
West (US) and the Soviet Union,”111 that divided the World between the spheres of the 
superpowers’ influence where from time to time they exercised their strategy of limited 
war through local and regional conflicts.  
Europe remained the most important range for the testing of the superpower’s 
bipolar influence, as well as the place where they implemented their policies and 
strategies.  Fortunately for the World and more specifically Europe, the superpowers 
shared the one common interest of the prevention of World War III. This common 
interest was the single most important reason why their disputes never went beyond 
limited escalation even during the worst crises in Korea, Suez and Cuba.  
1. Relaxation of Tensions  
After the 1950’s, the Cold War became more relaxed and allowed a transfer of 
emphasis from political-military to socioeconomic priorities. NATO experienced a new 
set of circumstances and challenges resulting in strategies ranging from containment, 
massive retaliation, flexible response to the policy of détente, which brought less tension 
in relations between the superpowers and their military alliances. The Détente policy was 
followed by the Ostpolitik initiative launched by German Chancellor Brandt.112 That 
initiative incorporated West Germany’s recognition of existing borders in Europe, 
including borders between the two German states. This warming of relations between a 
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divided Europe continued and resulted in the Helsinki Agreement. This agreement was 
signed at the 1975 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which 
“obliged the signatories to refrain from using force in order to change frontiers, to 
facilitate greater movement of peoples and ideas between the two parts of Europe, and to 
observe and promote the human rights of populations.”113 That served as a turning point 
following three decades of strained relations between the European East and West. Also, 
it helped in the SALT II negotiations that “begun under … Kissinger in 1972 and 
concluded by … Vance in 1978.”114 
Although Europe remained the most important area of competition among the 
superpowers, a myriad of other changes reshaped the rest of the world and Europe.  
European colonial empires declined along with an increase in their economic 
interdependence, which became obvious during the oil crises of 1973 and 1978.  
Technology advanced faster than anyone could imagine and resulted in space flights and 
moon landings. The superpowers remained in a stalemate position, having more than 
enough nuclear capability for mutual destruction, which resulted in a decline in the 
likelihood of using it. Those events had less of a negative effect on the West than on the 
Soviet Union. The ineffectiveness of communist central planning with regards to the 
economy could not keep pace with the rapid changes in the global economic 
environment, and became more and more protectionist and uncompetitive. On the 
contrary, flexible Western economies remained at the forefront of the new world 
economy and took leading roles in this process. The outcome of this dichotomy proved 
disastrous for the communist block. The last thing the Soviets needed was the 
introduction of the arms race imposed by the Reagan administration which did not allow 
the exhausted Soviet economy to rest.  
Adaptability and sustainability of increased economic activity was the obvious 
main advantage of the West against the Soviets. Western Europe’s economy recovered 
immediately after the end of WWII thanks to the huge American assistance through the 
Marshall Plan. Another crucial step was made with the foundation of a European Coal 
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and Steel Community,115 which later became the foundation of the European Economic 
Community. These and other advantages produced bigger and bigger economic gaps 
between the two blocs and resulted in growing pressure from the masses in communist 
countries for higher standards of living as well as democracy. Internal pressure was 
growing rapidly and especially in countries where the Soviet Army had imposed 
communism after WWII. That pressure also increased inside the USSR republics and 
Russia itself.  The strengthening of forbidden and almost forgotten nationalistic feelings 
was easily identified, and caught all planners and analysts off guard.  
Another very important factor that contributed to Western victory over 
communism was the rapid change in leadership that occurred in the Soviet block. A 
generation of communist leaders from WWII came to an end in a very short period of 
time. This was particularly obvious in the Soviet Union where “the old communist 
leaders – Brezhnev, Chernenko and Andropov – passed away in rapid succession in the 
mid-1980s.”116 Similar power changes occurred at all levels of the government 
throughout the entire communist block. The new generation of leaders was not satisfied 
with the existing situation and tried steps such as perestroika and glasnost without much 
success. The expectations of the masses increased rapidly.  The people wanted increased 
individual political and economic rights, which in the end, resulted in the implosion of 
the communist system.  
Finally, the amazing growth in the area of technology, especially 
communications, catapulted the entire world into the global economic market. The 
‘global village’ had been formed. This brought unprecedented economic interdependence 
and dictated a high level of cooperation throughout the world. These changes implicitly 
included flexibility in economic and business practices on a daily basis. The sluggish 
communist economy was incapable of rising to such a task. In that unexpected turn of 
world events, and without war, the communist system suddenly fell apart, mostly because 
of its inability to fulfill the expectations of its people. 
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2. NATO and Yugoslavia  
Bearing in mind that Tito’s Yugoslavia received significant Western help thanks 
to its semi-neutral position during the Cold War, it was obvious that the détente and, 
especially the end of the Cold War, would cause huge changes in its position. After Tito 
broke relations with Stalin in 1948, “the West was ready to overlook or minimize all 
other problems within Yugoslavia.”117 Also, “there was some discussion in western 
chanceries about possibility of trying to bring it fully into the West.”118 Tito’s skill in 
foreign policy was unchallenged. He managed to maintain a balance between the East 
and the West by “playing one side off against the other with various benefits – in terms of 
trade and both financial and military assistance.”119 At the same time, he played an 
important role in the non-aligned movement that, along with the soft version of 
communism at home, promoted him as a statesman with an excellent international 
reputation. However, “Yugoslavia was more important to the West as a virus which could 
infect the corpus communisti body than as a healthy member of the Western camp.”120 
Consequently, with the changes in European security environment, Yugoslavia’s position 
became delicate. 
Unresolved national questions, rapid increases in foreign debt, and dissatisfaction 
with political progress resulted in a dangerous mixture of elements. Following Tito's 
death in 1980, complications arose in Kosovo, but the main events in Yugoslavia would 
not occur until the second half of the 1980s. The most important effects in the region 
were political changes in the Soviet Union, which took place immediately after 
Gorbachev became the Secretary General in 1985. His relaxed attitude toward rigid 
communist rules changed the nature of the Soviet Union to a point where it looked a lot 
more like Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia’s strategic importance to the superpowers virtually 
disappeared overnight, allowing the equilibrium that had stabilized the region to 
disappear as well.  
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Yugoslavia’s collective presidency was not up to the challenge of dealing with 
this destabilization. Instead of concentrating on the future, they remained preoccupied 
with following Tito’s path at any cost. This impotency within the government paralyzed 
the decision making process within the country. The very influential WWII generation, 
along with JNA generals, predominantly held the opinion that Yugoslavia was threatened 
from all sides, and especially from NATO. Moreover, JNA generals believed that their 
task is “to save Yugoslav socialism from nationalism and Western imperialism.”121 
Others maintained the same opinion since any accusation of deviation from Tito’s path 
was synonymous with political suicide. Thus, the most developed communist country 
experienced Serbian militant nationalism instead of democratization. Dreams about 
democracy and prosperity turned into a nightmarish scene of human characters 
resembling a merging of antiquated post-WWII communists with primordial nationalists.  
3. The End of the Cold War 
The end of the Cold War resulted in colossal changes throughout Europe equal in 
comparison only to changes during the two World Wars. The bipolar structure of Europe 
disappeared through the decline of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact; Germany 
became reunified, and all communist multinational states, mostly relicts of Versailles, 
disintegrated.   
Almost overnight we find ourselves in a dramatically changed world, from 
which all the familiar landmarks of the past decades have vanished. The 
Iron Curtain, which had marked the bottom line of European policy for 
almost half a century, has fallen, the spirit of Yalta has evaporated from 
Europe, and what is left is a host of national, regional, economic and 
social factors which have emerged reluctantly from the secure ideological 
retreats they occupied during the Cold War.122  
The disappearance of communist ideology as the legal basis for the ruling elites in 
the Soviet block, along with the lack of democratic alternatives, brought with it the 
reemergence of nationalism. This was not old-fashioned nationalism. It was more the 
result of the surfacing of suppressed feelings, which had been concealed during decades 
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of Soviet internationalism. The dark prediction that nationalism represents the final stage 
of communism never came to fruition, mostly because of the relative national 
compactness of the CEE countries. Following a short period of time spent rediscovering 
national items and songs, countries began working on the more serious tasks at hand. 
They toiled with preparations for taking part in European political and economical 
activities, ”viewing membership in NATO as well as the EU as essential to securing their 
reintegration into the West.”123 The only country that had failed to do so, thanks to 
Serbian militant nationalism, was the former Yugoslavia. 
NATO and its members, although highly supportive of changes behind the Iron 
Curtain, were caught  totally unprepared for such a large number of changes in such a 
short period of time. Above all, the US was surprised with that new, unipolar world 
structure that gave it not only an unchallenged position as a superpower, but also 
responsibility for everything that happened around the world. Speculation began to arise 
regarding the continued need for the Alliance. NATO had not anticipated being caught 
without an exit strategy and struggled with its own new scope and purpose. During the 
crisis in the former Yugoslavia, all suspicions regarding NATO's ability to operate 
effectively within the new paradigm became reality. Despite the fact that the conflicts in 
the former Yugoslavia were the longest and bloodiest in Europe since WWII, NATO 
failed to react for almost three years. 
There were various reasons for this lack of effectiveness with the most important 
being the lack of a Soviet threat and the absence of US leadership. The Soviet Union was 
in the most ambiguous position during that time. Still playing an important role in the 
world and Europe, although simultaneously unable to maintain the Warsaw Pact, which 
was dissolved in July 1991, and too preoccupied with internal confusion, its dissolution 
occurred by the end of 1991. The absence of the Soviet counterbalance opened a huge 
security vacuum in the bipolar structure of power around the world and particularly in 
Europe. CEE states rushed toward the West looking for NATO protection against 
unpredictable events in the ex-Soviet Union. However, NATO, without clear US 
leadership, remained lethargic. The only significant reaction was the Joint Declaration of 
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22 members of NATO and Warsaw Pact in Paris on 19 November 1990. The Declaration 
stated, “that they are no longer adversaries and that they recognize that security is 
indivisible”124 in CSCE area.  
At the same time, the US concentrated on events in the Persian Gulf and was 
subsequently engaged in protecting its vital interests on the Arabian Peninsula. Building a 
coalition among Arab states while ensuring adequate support from European allies 
proved to be an extremely demanding task. Under European pressure to have ‘the hour of 
Europe,’ the US left Western Europe and its leading power, Great Britain to demonstrate 
its “ability to develop a common foreign policy and to exercise political influence outside 
Western Europe.”125 With this combination of events at the forefront of world politics, 
the importance of the emerging crisis in Yugoslavia and its repercussions on European 
security remained virtually ignored by US officials until 1992.  
Europe was left unassisted in the middle of the colossal transition of its central 
and eastern parts. Consequently, the old issue of balance of power in Europe was once 
again resurrected following German unification with a return to the European scene of 
old rivalries and, automatically, divisions regarding future security arrangements. The 
spirit of mutual confidence was suddenly lost. However, the ultimate question in Europe 
was the new position of the recently unified Germany and  its repercussions on the new 
security landscape. Political maneuvering began with the question of German unification 
that ”without Washington’s steadfast and visionary support, would not happened, given 
the opposition of Britain and France,”126 on the issue of the crumbling Yugoslavia. 
Germany, seeking a buffer zone from the east that was as broad as possible, supported all 
emerging democracies in Europe including Slovenia and Croatia. In order to counter this 
rise in German influence, Britain and France immediately granted support to Serbia. It 
was in that manner that the simple question of national independence was elevated to a 
question of prestige, and eventually to the status of an international crisis.  
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In this sorry sequence, Europe and the US proved to be equally misguided. 
Europe believed it could solve Yugoslavia without the US: Washington 
believed that, with the Cold War over, it could leave Yugoslavia to Europe 
… It would take four years to undo these mistakes – four years before 
Washington belatedly and reluctantly, but decisively, stepped in and 
asserted leadership, with European support. But this did not happened 
until even more severe strain within the [NATO], and historic disaster in 
Bosnia.127 
Consequently, NATO became ineffective. Although nobody openly questioned 
NATO's position regarding collective defense, the behavior of the European allies, 
particularly Britain and France, clearly demonstrated the necessity for a redefinition of 
NATO’s role in Europe. “France has been the leader in furthering both the removal of the 
US and the empowering of Europe as it presses its campaign for ‘independent’ 
Europe.”128 It became clear that without the Soviet threat, the heavy US presence in 
Europe was no longer necessary, especially if the situation in Europe continued to 
stabilize. That position made sense when considered in light of the planned 
transformation of the European Community into the European Union (EU), along with 
the emphasis on a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in Europe. “Obsessed 
with proving themselves … and preparing the difficult arrangements for their union … 
the EC was nonetheless in the vanguard of international efforts to deal with the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia.”129 Such a situation could also be seen as an attempt to replace 
US and Russian influence in Europe with influence from the European powers. 
Nevertheless, the rising crisis in Yugoslavia was surrounded with overall confusion and 
uncertainty regarding the future, particularly in terms of a sustainable security 
arrangement in the region. “Europeans and Americans had not been so divided since the 
Suez.”130 
B HOW NATO FOUND ITS SOUL – THE WARS IN FORMER 
YUGOSLAVIA  
The balance of power in Europe in a unipolar world seemed to be impossible, 
even oxymoronic. However, the example from the crises in the former Yugoslavia 
illustrated that it still exists. Although the disintegration of multinational communist 
                                                 
127 Ibid., p. 29. 
128 Lawrence S. Kaplan, The Long Entanglement, Praeger, Westport, CT, 1999, p. 189. 
129 James Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will, Columbia University Press, NY, 1997, p. 30. 
130 Lawrence S. Kaplan, The Long Entanglement, Praeger, Westport, CT, 1999, p. 189. 
 57
states in Europe obviously represented a historical process, receiving support from all 
sides in the case of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, in the case of the former 
Yugoslavia, the ghosts of Versailles and Yalta had been resurrected. Despite the fact that 
an integral Yugoslavia could not, under the given circumstances, exist as a modern 
European democratic state, non-Serbian nations were denied their right to become 
independent. However, warnings that the Serbs planned to maintain a strategy of 
annihilation of all non-Serbs fell on deaf ears in Western nations and resulted in the lack 
of decisive international action even in situations where Serbian leaders openly 
proclaimed their aggressive intentions. Milosevic gave a speech on 28 June 1989 in 
Kosovo that was more a cry for war than a form of political expression where he stated, 
“…Six centuries later, again we are in battles and quarrels. They are not armed battles, 
though such things should not be excluded yet.”131 The reaction of the West following 
such an open threat was mild, even nonexistent. Sadly, this very speech started a chain of 
events that would later become paramount to the problem of European security.  
Without any doubt, Serbia under Milosevic’s leadership represented the starting 
point and the source of all crises and wars in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s. 
Serbian policy of militant nationalism was established with the full support of the Serbian 
population, including both the masses and intelligentsia. Serbia broke the common 
state,132 carried out aggression, occupation and ethnic cleansing toward neighboring 
nations. Serbia was not prevented or stopped mostly because of contradictory interests 
among powerful members of the international community and their lack of understanding 
of what had actually happened. The policy of preservation of the former Yugoslavia 
prevailed during the decisive moments of 1991.133  Meanwhile, the Serbs interpreted 
international reaction as a green light for pursuing their goals under the premise of 
solving internal problems. Interestingly, the permanent members of the UN Security 
Council, Britain, France, and Russia (in that order), and, to a much smaller extent, China 
and the US, instead of helping victims, deliberately, or not, arranged circumstances that 
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facilitated Serbian aggression. It started with the arms embargo 134 imposed on all the 
former Yugoslav countries that actually helped the Serbs maintain their dominant 
position by keeping the vast majority of JNA weapons. This opened the door for a decade 
of wars, and preset their probable outcomes. 
1. Controversy within NATO 
Serbian aggression towards Croatia, under the pretense of protecting ‘endangered’ 
Croatian Serbs, opened up a whole set of controversies among NATO allies. The EC 
troika, led by Luxembourg’s foreign minister Poos,135 ensured the withdrawal of the JNA 
from Slovenia in July 1991. “The Serbs insisted that Slovenia’s secession was a fait 
accompli … [and] that the Serbs and Slovenes had sewn it all up.”136 Such an outcome 
left Croatia alone with disastrous consequences: Serbian occupation of one third of 
Croatian territory and ethnic cleansing of all non-Serbs. After the Vukovar massacre, 
disagreements among European countries regarding Croatian independence gradually 
developed into a crisis. Germany stipulated its “cooperation with Britain over 
amendments to the [Maastricht] treaty in return for Britain agreeing to Croatian 
recognition. Germany’s behavior provoked a spasm of chauvinistic hysteria in 
Britain.”137 The only supportive voice among British politicians was Lady Thatcher’s. 
“She not only pleaded for recognition of the new republics but roundly supported 
supplying them with arms as well.”138 However, in spite of all these complications, 
Croatia was recognized and the pretence of European unity had been preserved. 
Beside European differences, the UN Security Council hesitated in recognizing 
the new states and gave the Serbs more time to continue their aggression as in the case of 
Croatia. Even when the UN recognized a new state, as in BiH, the Security Council 
refused to help the state to survive by making the non-Serb population helpless victims 
whose destiny depended on mercy and foreign aid. It appeared as though the permanent 
members of the Security Council, under the pretense of the prevention of conflict 
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escalation, were more preoccupied with the protection or disregard of the Serbian 
aggressor, than with providing help for countless victims. The statement given by the 
Venezuelan Ambassador to the UN is, probably the best illustration of the biased 
approach toward the crisis:  
Already nearly two hundred thousand people have died. More than two 
million people have been displaced from their homes. Twenty thousand 
women have been raped. The International Court of Justice and the Word 
Conference on Human Rights have indicated that BiH is a victim of 
genocide and ethnic cleansing, among other unspeakable crimes. For this 
council, then, what precisely does it mean to say that violence would 
increase and spread?139 
Numerous examples illustrate that all permanent members of the Security Council 
were involved in the BiH tragedy in debatable way. However, the role of Britain was 
particularly revolting.  
The British approach to Serbian aggression was much more comparable to the 
sponsorship and assistance of Serbian strategic goals than to neutral arbitration. By using 
their position in the UN, in the EU where Britain obtain its six-month presidency in 1992, 
and on the ground in BiH where the British and the French provided the majority of the 
7,500 UN troops,140 the British ensured to the Serbs and JNA enough time to occupy 
about 70 percent of the territory of BiH. Britain then assisted in the redistribution of guilt 
among all sides involved in the war, and proposed the plans141 through its negotiators for 
the partition of BiH. Additionally, the British refused any appropriate UN action toward  
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the Serbian side, which protected the Serbs from punishment 142 for committing atrocities 
and violations in UN safe areas.  
The so-called leaders of the Western world have known what is happening 
here for the last year and a half. They receive play-by-play reports. They 
talk of prosecuting war criminals, but do nothing to stop the crimes. May 
God forgive them. May God forgive us all.143 
Above all, they used humanitarian aid to blackmail BiH representatives144 in order 
to facilitate the partitioning of the state. Finally, when the US assumed the lead in the 
BiH crisis, British politicians refused to cooperate by imposing every imaginable formal 
obstacle to US efforts, especially with regard to the Security Council.  
Thus, it became clear that none of the European powers could become involved in 
crises in Europe without a heavily biased approach and favoritism toward one side. Even 
more important was the fact that without strong US leadership, NATO would play only a 
symbolic role, and might be relegated to the status of a political and military eunuch. The 
lack of US interest in the former Yugoslavia during the initial stages of the crisis was 
understandable, but later became counterproductive to US policy in the region.  The US 
administration had entangled itself in the net of an old European quarrel without a clear 
vision of how to solve the problem. The US ambassador to Belgrade, Warren 
Zimmermann, contributed to this situation by allowing himself to be captured by Serbian  
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propaganda145 and further confused the causes and consequences. The Serbs often alluded 
to his German origin and the US “intention to turn the Balkans into a sphere of influence, 
sharing domination with Germany.”146 In so doing, the Serbs were planning on the 
counter support from old European allies, but at a minimum, the US refusal to take sides. 
With little help from Serbian supporters, above all Eagleburger and Scowcroft, who were 
among the highest ranking officials in the US administration at that time, this did not 
seem impossible.  
At the same time, there were powerful Congressmen and Senators who pushed for 
a more rigorous stance of the US government against Serbian aggression.  However, 
Senator Dole’s words “We have already waited too long … Milosevic’s policies were 
part of a bigger plan … We must move beyond words to action … Lives are at stake, 
democracy is at stake, and, freedom is at stake,”147 fell on deaf ears.  The same effect was 
achieved when Congressmen Lantos criticized the US approach towards the crisis in BiH 
and stated,  
The problem is that there is an election in 90 days, and this election 
paralyzes the administration … Those little children do not have 90 days 
…do we join in the European failure, or do we take a position of 
leadership?148  
Obviously, the election was a bigger priority, but the topic of BiH was decisive 
for winning the election. President Clinton used the crisis in BiH relentlessly during his 
presidential campaign. Thus, the crisis in Yugoslavia became global. After Clinton took 
office the following problems emerged: How would he win domestic support for action 
in the Balkans? How could the US neutralize failures of the allies without damaging 
NATO? How could NATO help the thousands of suffering people in the region? In total, 
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solving this ‘problem from hell’ with little or no support from military circles seemed 
impossible, but there was no alternative.   
In actuality, there was no broad based opposition to further US involvement in the 
crisis within Congress or the administration. It was rather disagreements or confusion 
about a comprehensive strategy of the US involvement in the BiH crisis. The main 
obstacle was a reluctant military leader (Powell) who did not want to carry out any 
serious action on the ground in BiH. The Pentagon’s surprising willingness to send troops 
to Somalia “was Powell’s way of doing something humanitarian but, equally important, 
of not sending troops to Bosnia.”149 Obviously, he was not able to move out of the scope 
of the Vietnam syndrome and the Weinberger doctrine. Luckily, Powell was on his way 
out of office, and support from Congress and the Senate was almost guaranteed because 
of Senator Dole’s influence on the Republican majority.  
However, the first moves of the new administration were far from being 
successful. Nothing promising happened during Secretary of State Christopher’s trip to 
the European capitols in May 1993 where he tried to ensure support for the US lift and 
strike policy of lifting the embargo on BiH and using NATO air strikes against the Serbs 
following the Serbian refusal to sign the Vance-Owen plan. As in the past, the Serbs had 
been well informed of their pending fate, and therefore formally agreed with the Vance-
Owen plan on the same day that Christopher arrived. This turned his trip into a fiasco and 
“provided the allies an excuse to hold off supporting, if not rejecting, the US 
proposal.”150 Naturally, the Serbs later totally rejected the peace plan.  
2. U.S. Taking Initiative within NATO 
In spite of such embarrassing diplomatic events, wheels began to turn in the 
direction of real progress. During the summer of 1993, the US significantly changed its 
approach towards Western European allies. The US began to insist on a more concrete 
solution to the BiH crisis, and sent warnings that “the future of the Alliance was on the 
line. If nothing was done and Sarajevo collapsed, the NATO summit scheduled for 
January 1994 would be a farce, and transatlantic relations would be severely 
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damaged.”151 This message was clearly understood and the reaction came immediately 
during the North Atlantic Council meeting on 2 August 1993. “After a marathon, sixteen-
hour session that was ‘as bitter and rancorous a discussion as has ever taken place in the 
alliance,’ the allies finally reached an agreement”152 about possible NATO engagement in 
BiH.  
That was the turning point, and although Britain and France could continue to 
undermine efforts by using their veto within the UN, this moment had marked the full 
return of the US into European policy. Frictions between the US and allies continued for 
some time, although with decreasing intensity. In light of the forthcoming NATO summit 
along with receiving a lot of criticism from the US side, “I had the feeling that the British 
and French felt it was far more important to avoid lifting the arms embargo than to save 
the [BiH] country,”153 the European allies reduced their opposition to US views. This 
opened the door not only for the harmonization of mutual relations, but also for the 
introduction of Partnership for Peace into the discussion, first as an idea, and then as a 
program adopted at the NATO Brussels summit in January of 1994.  
Naturally, all of this was just the beginning of the clarification of the situation on 
the ground in BiH. Once the US got on board and NATO became engaged, all challenges 
seemed to be solvable. Stabilization of the complex situation on the ground started with 
pressure on Croatian and Muslim leaders to end their senseless mutual conflict. This 
problem was easily solved since almost the entire Muslim and Croatian populations, with 
the exception of a small number of extremists, did not support the conflict between the 
nations from the very beginning. Just a few serious warnings were enough to change 
Croatian policy toward the Muslims, and vice versa.154 After a round of negotiations, 
Croats and Muslims signed the Washington Agreement on March 18, 1994, forming the 
Croat-Muslim Federation. This represented major progress but huge preparations were 
required in order to prepare for upcoming ground operations. 
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Changes in France, when Chirac became the President in the spring 1995, 
decisively altered the Western approach towards the BiH crisis. Chirac’s “predecessor 
Mitterrand … had shown pro-Serbian sentiment … steeped in the history of Serbian 
[non-existent] resistance to Germany in two world wars.”155 Chirac’s decision to end the 
BiH farce, through closer cooperation with and under the leadership of the US, left 
Britain alone and enabled a resolute solution to the crisis. Finally, in 1995, all 
circumstances were met for the final cut and, after Croatia liberated most of its own 
territory, the Serbs could be defeated and the BiH entanglement solved. Another critical 
moment was the Serbian massacre of the Muslim population in the UN ‘safe area’ of 
Srebrenica. “23,000 women and children were herded like a cattle out of the enclave and 
… almost 8,000 men and boys were executed en masse”156 in July of 1995.  Following 
the horrific events of Srebrenica, even the most ardent opponents to the use of force 
against the Serbs disappeared. Serbian attempts, following abandonment by France and 
even by Britain, to engage their new protector, Russia, were unsuccessful. 
Croatia liberated its territory in only a few days in early August which drastically 
changed the military balance in the region and strategically improved the position of the 
Croat-Muslim Federation in BiH. US eagerness to end the tragedy in BiH was bolstered 
after three members of Holbrooke’s negotiation team died in a tragic but suspicious 
accident while trying to reach Sarajevo over almost impassable roads. NATO bombing 
eventually started by the end of August and lasted for two weeks. NATO followed the air 
campaign with the introduction of ground forces of the Croatian Army followed by the 
BiH 5th Corps that commenced with offensive operations, and by mid September, had 
achieved a 50:50 ratio of BiH territory.  
Constant coordination conducted among Croatia, the US, and NATO resulted in 
the rapid resolution of a previously ‘unsolvable’ problem. Croatian victories clearly 
refuted trumped-up stories and myths about Serbs and their heroic fighting spirit. When 
faced with an equal force the Serbs simply ran. However, the decline of the former 
Yugoslavia and the BiH tragedy, had helped NATO to define its raison d`être as the main 
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pillar of European security and further confirmed the necessity of a US presence in 
Europe for the unforeseeable future. 
3. Dayton and Beyond 
Immediately after the fighting stopped, preparation for future settlement of BiH 
began, and culminated with the signing of the Dayton Agreement in Paris. The Dayton 
Agreement was made possible only under enormous US pressure, but the US had put its 
credibility on the line, allowing no other option but success. At the same time, neither 
side involved in the conflict was in a position to complain very strongly. The Croats and 
Muslims were exhausted in every sense of the word, and despite their understandable 
desire for revenge, it seemed unlikely that their alliance would last without US 
sponsorship. The Serbs obviously deserved worse treatment, but the opportunity for 
revenge escaped with the Croatian or US failure to take Banja Luka.157 It is also evident 
that the Serbs received far more territory than would be normal according to their 
percentage of the population.  That led to a paradoxical situation where all sides were at 
the same time pleased and dissatisfied with the results of the Dayton Agreement. 
However, on a more global scale, Europe and its unity had been saved along with a 
renewal of the power and, more importantly, credibility of the NATO alliance.   
Consequently, an examination of who gained what from the Dayton Agreement 
differs greatly depending on whose standpoint is taken. Without any doubt, NATO was 
the biggest winner. It regained its unity and credibility as the only respectable force 
within Europe.  The NATO-led peacekeeping mission in BiH made it possible for NATO 
allies to work together as a military organization with the assistance of numerous PfP 
countries, including Russia. This granted a unique opportunity for military cooperation 
on the ground which automatically led to better mutual relationships among European 
nations on the political level. In fact, the US “vision of a Europe that is undivided, 
peaceful, and democratic was well on the way to becoming a reality.”158 Also, NATO 
leadership during the UN-sponsored operation contributed to the establishment of a 
framework for future interaction between NATO and the UN. Finally, NATO had been 
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elevated in the eyes of the common people, inside and outside of the region and became a 
symbol of reliability and protection throughout the world.  
On yet another front, stood the international community represented by its various 
organizations that, despite sharing a considerable amount of responsibility for the 
tragedies of BiH, became by some measures de facto rulers of BiH. Widespread 
skepticism, based on previous experiences regarding the efficiency of international 
community bodies and representatives, was extremely evident among the population of 
BiH. From the very beginning it was questionable as to whether or not the international 
community had the political will to help BiH recover. Glorious speeches and 
unsubstantiated promises, along with the engagement of a myriad of jobless politicians 
and bureaucrats, needed to be replaced with concrete measures and true progress. 
Unfortunately, almost none of the initial promises materialized, and the international 
bureaucracy became a sort of barrier to the improvement of the overall situation in BiH.  
More troubling than the antics of the international bureaucracy was the fact that 
after all their atrocities, the Serbs received 49 percent of the land in BiH along with 
international recognition in the form of the Republika Srpska. This guaranteed a semi-
independent position inside of BiH for the Serbs. Serbs from Serbia escaped any 
punishment, although they had been the spiritus movens of the Greater Serbia project 
through participation in various facets, from military forces to organized pillaging and 
relocation of factories, of the wars in Croatia and BiH. This third Serbian attempt during 
the 20th century to form a Greater Serbia was less successful than the preceding two, and 
again had been planned at the cost of other nations and Serbs outside of Serbia.  
Milosevic’s description of BiH Serbs during Dayton reads, “They are not my 
friends. They are not my colleagues. It is awful just to be in the same room with them for 
so long. They are shit.”159 This statement represented the best illustration of the treatment 
of BiH Serbs in Serbia. However, after being discarded by mother Serbia, and earning a 
terrible reputation for massacres during the war, the BiH Serbs still received a 
comfortable arrangement in Dayton. The only problem from a BiH Serb perspective is 
the piecemealed, excluding the Banja Luka region, shape of the territory of the Republika 
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Srpska that cannot fulfill basic economic and infrastructure standards, which could, in the 
long run, result in new complications.  
The Muslim position remained ambiguous. Under the given circumstances, they 
received the best possible results, but were at the same time, put into such a delicate 
position by Serbian aggression coupled with the inactiveness of the international 
community. Consequently, they expected more in terms of the Dayton Agreement. 
Unable to defend themselves under the conditions of the arms embargo, Muslims 
accepted any help offered, including that from mujahedins, which led to numerous 
problems and strained relations with the international community. However, unsolved 
issues such as the eastern part of BiH that remained under Serbian control and a fragile 
federation with BiH Croats, continued to burden Muslim relations with surrounding 
countries. In addition to enormous human losses of 250,000 killed, 35,000 wounded, 
26,000 disappearances, 50,000 victims tortured, 20,000 – 50,000 vic tims raped,160 a 
further obstacle was the overall destruction of the BiH economy which was barely 
addressed in Dayton. The Dayton Agreement did, however, bring an end to the suffering 
along with NATO military protection for BiH Muslims.  
Paradoxically, even after being such a vital contributor, along with the US and 
NATO, in ensuring the circumstances that led to the Dayton Agreement, the only obvious 
loser in this chain of events was Croatia. Such an outcome was made possible for various 
reasons, but primarily because of the constant lack of vision of Croatian politicians in 
BiH. This lack of vision caused numerous disagreements inside Croatia itself including 
the splintering of Tudjman’s HDZ. Of equal importance was the continuous refusal by 
the West to view Croatia outside of a Yugoslavian frame of reference. However, under 
the circumstances preceding the Dayton Agreement, the Croatian leadership had missed 
an opportunity to obtain a better deal with the US that would have guaranteed unhindered 
access to Western integration.  Through its actions as an unofficial NATO ground force 
and suffering numerous casualties in the process, Croatia deserved at a minimum 
membership in PfP. However, the Croatian leadership, fascinated with momentary 
successes and plagued by Tudjman’s vanity, agreed to a solution that left BiH Croats as 
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the smallest nation in a less than desirable position. Also, the Croatian leadership did not 
insist on a Serbian indictment for the wars and consequently, did not receive reparations 
for their devastation of the country.  
Croatia furthermore agreed to a three-year interim period for eastern Slavonia, 
along with the unnecessary positioning of UN troops on the Prevlaka peninsula. 
Additionally, Croatia allowed the transfer and supply of the NATO-led Implementation 
Force (IFOR) over Croatian territory along with the usage of the Croatian infrastructure, 
which brought only symbolic or no reimbursement. Croatia also assumed numerous 
obligations under the Dayton Agreement, such as arms limitation, refugee and war crimes 
that subjected the country to constant monitoring by different international institutions 
along with the presence of UN troops on Croatian soil. These very factors later became 
the main obstacles to the development of the country, and for progress with regards to 
Western integration. The only positive international result was Croatian acceptance into 
the European Council (EC) in 1996. Self-consolation for being a ‘silent NATO member,’ 
by complying with every imaginable NATO/US request, did not bring concrete benefits, 
only a modicum of questionable prestige. 
C. NATO’S PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE  
After the war and subsequent celebrations were over, international attention 
declined rapidly, leaving Croatia in the position of a nation forgotten in war. Instead of 
focusing on the materialization of previous cooperation with the US and NATO, 
Tudjman decided to swim in the murky waters of European diplomatic circles while at 
the same time muddling in BiH internal politics. The Croatian domestic political scene 
went from bad to worse when the HDZ introduced the division of the Croatian people 
into the two categories of ‘nationally constructive’ and “others”. This inflammatory act 
rapidly polarized the nation and brought about an untouchable position for the ruling elite 
and circles surrounding the president. US support gradually cooled, ending in only 
routine contacts and membership in European institutions became more of a distant 
dream in 1999 than it had been in 1995. Attempts to join PfP did not even reach the level 
of serious discussions. Without question, Croatia had become some type of European 
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buffer zone from BiH and Serbia, neither fully excluded nor accepted, and simply left 
alone with its internal struggle for democracy.  
In the meantime, Europe intensified the processes of integration in many areas.  In 
1992, Maastrich ushered in a new way of economic unification by opening long closed 
European doors for new members.  In January of 1994, NATO went a step further in the 
creation of PfP by the expansion during the next two years of 27 European countries that 
signed the Framework Document. Under this document, partner countries were asked to 
fulfill five basic objectives which included: 
· to facilitate transparency in national defense planning and budgeting 
processes 
· to ensure democratic control of defense forces 
· to maintain the capability and readiness to contribute to operations under 
the authority of the UN and/or the responsibility of the OSCE 
· to develop cooperative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of 
joint planning, training and exercises, in order to strengthen the ability of 
PfP participants to undertake missions in the field of peacekeeping, search 
and rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as may subsequently be 
agreed upon 
· to develop, over the longer term, forces that are better able to operate with 
those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance161 
During the period of PfP creation and implementation, an especially important 
role was performed by the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which in 1997 
became the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). NACC was formed in early 1992 
with the main purpose to ensure “NATO support for CSCE in dealing with … disaster 
relief and refugee programs … and other new security challenges in Europe.”162 NACC 
actually started the cooperation between former enemies from NATO and the Warsaw 
Pact by bringing them together around the negotiation table. Undoubtedly, the broad 
scope of PfP countries, from developed Sweden, Finland, Switzerland and Austria to ex-
Soviet republics in Central Asia, clearly illustrated that all 27 countries could not meet 
the aforementioned criteria. However, during the first wave of PfP formation, political 
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reasons overruled technical criteria to include the acceptance of countries that fought 
each other (Caucasus), or had been under the rule of a dictatorship (Belarus). PfP 
countries raised the number of mutual activities and transformed an extremely hostile 
continent into an area of cooperation that was unimaginable only a few years ago. 
Despite the initial doubts and reservations, particularly because of possible Russian 
counter reaction, PfP showed remarkable improvement in the European security picture 
in a very short time.  
This resulted in increased Croatian expectations that some deficiencies in 
domestic politics and complicated international venues would be tolerated or overlooked. 
Evidently, political interests opposing Croatian membership were more dominant than 
expected in NATO circles, and Croatia remained a non-member. Under those 
circumstances, although somewhat tacitly, Croatia’s links with the US, especially 
military ones, have remained. Aside from MPRI which has been working with Croatia 
since 1994, various activities continued through American educational programs, such as 
IMET, JCTP, the Marshall Center, military academies, along with bilateral cooperation, 
and partnership with the state of Minnesota.163 Language training in Croatia and abroad 
brought the Croatian military closer to their desired level of interoperability with NATO 
forces. In spite of these many advances, the ruling elite always prevented finalization of 
the necessary steps for Croatia's advancement.  Examples of strategic documents that 
were finished but not adopted, and the new organizational chart for the Ministry of 
Defense which was adopted but never fully implemented clearly showed a lack of 
political will for changes that might endanger certain privileged individuals.  
1. NATO Enlargement 
In June of 1994, Russia agreed to mutual cooperation with NATO through a 
Special Partnership. This decreased skepticism and allowed the idea of NATO 
enlargement to become a reality. Although the pressure of the Visegrad Group of Poland, 
Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia for NATO membership began immediately 
after the collapse of communism, the process of NATO enlargement actually started with 
the ‘NATO Participation Act’ adopted in the US senate on the 8th of October 1994.  This 
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was a logical continuation of the ‘National Security Restoration Act’ proposed on 27 
September, which asked for NATO membership for the Visegrad countries not later than 
1999. Despite Yeltsin’s warning that NATO enlargement could cause what he called a 
‘Cold Peace,’ the US continued forward with the idea. President Clinton, while arguing 
with NATO enlargement opponents on 13 January 1995, stated, “They would confine the 
newly free peoples of Central Europe to a zone of insecurity and, therefore, instability… 
those visions for Europe are too narrow, too skeptical, perhaps even too cynical.”164  
Such an unusual US position in its approach to NATO enlargement practically disarmed 
opponents both in the US and Europe, leaving little room for additional maneuvering. 
Remaining issues would have to be resolved through a process of intensified dialogue 
between NATO and aspirant countries. 
At the NATO foreign ministers meeting in Brussels on 5 December 1995, two 
months after the North Atlantic Council (NAC) approved the enlargement study, the 
following goals for aspirant countries were decided.  Aspirant countries would be 
required to 
· pursue ‘intensified dialogue’ through bilateral and multilateral 
consultations with partners, build on the foundation of enlargement study 
· strengthen the PfP, which some partners will facilitate the ir ability to 
assume the responsibilities of membership 
· consider what internal adaptation are necessary to ensure that enlargement 
preserves the effectiveness of the alliance, particularly resource and 
staffing implications 165 
The following two years were spent in preparation and adaptation of aspirant 
countries.  During the NATO summit in Madrid in July 1997 the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland were invited to become full NATO members in the year 1999. This 
event ended the exhausting process of breaking the Iron Curtain, and finally made faster 
European integration for CEE countries possible. 
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2. Kosovo Crisis 
Everything appeared almost perfect in preparation for the 50th anniversary of 
NATO in Washington. Only one detail was unpredictable: the Serbs. Following their 
well-known pattern of provocation throughout the former Yugoslavia, the Serbs 
instigated a crisis in Kosovo. Although not widely reported, Kosovo remained turbulent 
during the wars in Croatia and BiH, but thanks to Gandhi-style Albanian resistance, and 
the ignorance of the international community, the situation in Kosovo never escalated 
beyond sporadic clashes between Serbian police and (para)military forces and Albanian 
protestors. However, by the end of the 1990s, the situation began to deteriorate rapidly. 
Serbs living in Kosovo complained that despite Milosevic’s promises that Kosovo would 
be a Serb homeland again, and Serb control of power, privileges and jobs, they still 
remained a threatened minority. The Serbian government, in order to modify the 
unfavorable national structure of the population of Kosovo (90 percent Albanians) tried 
to resettle Serbs that had escaped from Croatia and BiH into Kosovo. Naturally, Albanian 
reaction was furious and the conflict escalated during 1998, bringing with it two hundred 
thousand refugees166 and the development of a situation similar to that witnessed in BiH.  
This time the Serbs had miscalculated the reaction of the international community 
that could not allow itself the embarrassment of a fiasco similar to that in BiH. Although 
“the Europeans were taking cover by talking about having a UN Security Council 
Resolution before they acted in Kosovo,”167 and were counting on a Russia veto, the US 
dismissed such complaints. Thus, the reaction of the proverbially slow institutions like 
the UN and EU were relatively fast, to say nothing of the US and NATO, who wanted to 
reestablish their credibility after experiencing so many problems in BiH.  Milosevic tried 
tactics similar to those he had used in BiH; but this time the US and NATO were willing 
to stop his actions and the threat of ethnic cleansing by using all means necessary.  
Despite strong Russian opposition in the UN Security Council, the US and NATO allies 
continued to increase pressure on the Milosevic regime and were again forced to take 
military action after the failure of the negotiations at Rambouillet.  
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NATO intervention in Kosovo began without UN approval on 24 March 1999, 
and represented NATO’s first military engagement against a rogue state inside a state’s 
internationally recognized borders. This unprecedented approach led to international 
confusion and to requests for an examination of legality of the action even from European 
allies. However, facing the Serbian variant of the ‘final solution’ that caused the problem 
of a million refugees that nobody wanted to accept, a pragmatic approach prevailed over 
legal issues.168 The seventy-eight days bombing were not of the same intensity as that 
during the Gulf War, but Milosevic’s power declined, and he was fo rced to agree with the 
ceasefire set forth in UN Security Council Resolution 1244, which also mandated the 
presence of a NATO-led international force in Kosovo to include the Russians.   
3. NATO Admits New Members  
In the meantime, overshadowed by the Kosovo crisis, the most important NATO 
event occurred which was the 50th anniversary of NATO at the NATO Washington 
summit. During this summit, NATO admitted Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic 
as new members. In addition to the accession of three new members, NATO proclaimed 
an ‘open door’ policy, which would allow an additional NATO enlargement by the year 
2002. NATO also adopted a package of measures for the Enhanced and More Operational 
Partnership (EMOP).This package contained four primary components:  
· Political-Military Framework for NATO-led Peacekeeping Operations 
· Expanded and Adapted Planning and Review Process (PARP) 
· Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC) 
· PfP Training and Education Enhancement Program (TEEP)169 
With these measures came a new wave of enthusiasm in the CEE, along with an 
enhanced willingness of CEE countries to continue on their path towards full membership 
in Western organizations. Croatia, mostly because of internal reasons, international 
position and aforementioned mistakes missed the Washington summit and with it, the 
possibility to become a NATO aspirant in 1999 through participation in MAP. Namely, 
all PfP partners who desired NATO membership were allowed to participate 
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automatically without particular assessments. By failing to set a course for participation 
in MAP, the Croatian ruling elite had created additional unfavorable circumstances for 
Croatia's membership in the NATO alliance.  
To make matters worse, Croatia’s promising tourist season had also been 
negatively influenced by NATO intervention in Kosovo, which resulted in a substantial 
decline in the GDP. Instead of the planned economic growth, Croatia’s economic results 
dropped. Such negative effects, despite trumped-up promises announced in the newly 
established Stability Pact, were never reimbursed, which caused further Croatian 
skepticism about the factual intentions of the West. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The formation of the NATO Alliance in 1949 represented the crucial moment for 
European and world security in the second half of the 20th century. Strong US backing of 
Western Europe, both economically and militarily, made possible its stabilization and 
democratization during the Cold War. The US-led NATO secured uninterrupted 
development of Western Europe on the one hand. On the other hand, the lack of 
economic development provoked dissatisfaction and indirectly caused the decline of 
communism and the dissolution of the Soviet- led Warsaw Pact. However, the unity of 
NATO was challenged after the Soviet threat disappeared in the late 1980s, and new 
kinds of threats emerged. This became most obvious during the initial stage of the crisis 
in the former Yugoslavia where the most powerful NATO members followed 
contradictory interests. Thus, the wars in the former Yugoslavia influenced not only the 
destiny of the region, but also redirected NATO’s development. 
The turning point for the continued existence of the Alliance occurred in 1993, 
when the US reestablished its leadership and brought the BiH quagmire to an end. The 
US engagement ended the war relatively quickly and created the possibility for close 
cooperation between NATO members and PfP countries, or former Warsaw Pact 
members.  Through NATO sponsored PfP activities, cooperation increased along with 
mutual understanding which resulted in NATO membership for three CEE countries in 
1999. The European division along Iron Curtain boundaries no longer existed and 
Europe’s future looked very bright and created a completely new strategic grouping, with 
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the US playing a key role. NATO’s ‘out of area’ engagements in BiH and Kosovo opened 
a new chapter in solving international problems and inaugurating NATO as the only 
reliable security institution in Europe and beyond. 
Croatia, unfortunately, missed the opportunity to participate in those processes, 
partially because of the inability of its politicians to recognize the uniqueness of its 
position in the region, and partially because of inherited stereotypes about Croatia. Thus, 
a few years were spent on fruitless attempts by Croatian and Western politicians to 
outsmart each other instead of trying to solve the common problems in Southeastern 
Europe. The turn of the century saw a change in Croatian domestic politics and a change 
in the Western approach towards Croatia and offered more cooperativeness and almost 
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IV. CROATIA’S PATH TO NATO 
Even though Croatia is not yet participating in MAP, NATO should 
extend the invitation to include it. However, Croatia will have to meet the 
same criteria as all other applicant countries before it can become a 
member of the Alliance.170 
The year 2000 brought not only the symbolic turn of the millennium, but also the 
end of wars in the region and broad changes in the political state of affairs in most 
countries involved. It started on 3 January 2000 with the elections in Croatia that marked 
tremendous changes in Croatian domestic politics and equally significant as those that 
occurred at the beginning of the 1990’s. It continued with fast democratization inside the 
country which caused positive effects on neighboring countries, and sped up the process 
for Croatian acceptance by the West.  
The reaction of Western countries, especially the US, was surprisingly prompt, 
which resulted in Croatian membership in PfP, WTO and the signing of Stabilization and 
Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU within two years to mention just the most 
important. Following these memberships, the Croatian craving for larger participation 
increased together with expectations for full- fledged membership in the NATO alliance. 
The reasons were obvious: Croatia fulfilled most of the demands stipulated by the 
international community, the previous wave of NATO enlargement was more than 
successful, other aspirant countries were in similar or worse overall condition than 
Croatia according to the basic parameters, and finally Croatia can offer more benefits to 
NATO than any other aspirant country. In that light, Croatian membership in NATO 
seems to be almost a natural consequence of processes that started with the end of the 
Cold War. 
A. CROATIA’S PRESENT SITUATION AND MEMBERSHIP IN WESTERN 
ASSOCIATIONS  
The parliamentary and presidential elections in January 2000 resulted in the 
victory of the coalition of six opposition parties and the formation of the new government 
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led by Prime Minister Racan. The newly elected President, Stjepan Mesic, announced 
immediately after the election that he would leave his party and become a non-partisan 
president. According to pre-election promises, he gave up most of his inherited 
prerogatives and became a president of new initiatives. In February, the newly elected 
government announced its ‘Program of the Government of the Republic of Croatia for the 
Period 2000-2004’. The main national foreign policy goals emphasized in the program 
were Croatian “accession to the European Union and NATO and the promotion of good-
neighborly policies.”171  
This shift in Croatian policy was warmly accepted by the US and European 
officials who enthusiastically started visiting Zagreb after the governmental changes. 
During his visit to Zagreb NATO Secretary General Robertson said that, “Croatia's 
resolve to open a new chapter after the death of President Tudjman was among the best 
news at the turn of the twenty-first century.”172 The US Secretary of State Albright said 
after talks in Zagreb with the Prime Minister Racan that, “Croatia had set an example for 
neighboring Serbia by turning away from ultranationalism and towards Europe.”173 
Speaking to reporters in Zagreb, the European Commission President Prodi said, “the EU 
would help Croatia in its social and economic development and promote a stable and 
lasting peace in the region.”174 Croatian public and media, unaccustomed to so much 
foreign attentiveness, created a euphoric atmosphere and expectations that went beyond 
the country’s capabilities. 
During the following two years, Croatia extended tremendous efforts in different 
areas connected with the realization of the proclaimed goals and succeeded in coming 
very close to realizing these goals. However, this was not an easy path. Rather, it was a 
constant struggle to overcome a myriad of inherited international and domestic problems 
along with continuously delicate relationships among members of the ruling coalition. 
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But, the results of the new Croatian government after the first two years are satisfactory, 
despite some unresolved problems, and provide a firm basis for further improvement.  
1. The Legacy of the 1990s  
To overcome various negative influences inherited from previous eras, the new 
Croatian authorities faced the dilemma of which issue to tackle first. The situation was 
critical in many areas, but the following were the most urgent:  
· International relations were at a rudimentary level and Croatia was 
constantly on the defensive. International semi- isolation, although never 
proclaimed, kept Croatia out of the European mainstream. Non-
membership in the key security and economic institutions produced the 
situation of a gray zone. Unresolved problems with neighboring countries 
and the slowness in resolving these issues and the constant preoccupation 
with BiH and its internal problems kept Croatian politics anchored to the 
pandemonium in BiH. 
· The political system, although semi-presidential in theory, was purely 
presidential in practice. The Parliament and the government were just 
operational tools in the hands of the President who directly jeopardized the 
functioning of the already fragile democratic institutions. Basic strategic 
documents were never adopted and disseminated, which encouraged 
improvisation and arbitrariness. The rule of law was dubious, which 
produced a lack of trust in legal institutions. The state institutions were 
overflowing with politically correct but incapable cadre. The majority of 
the media was sensationalistic and used more for propaganda purposes 
than for information. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) virtually 
did not exist. 
· The economic system was heavily damaged by the war and additionally 
shaken with problematic privatization and omnipresent corruption. 
Nontransparent trading arrangements with BiH and unpaid taxes brought 
the state budget close to collapse. The trader’s lobby almost strangled 
industrial production. Revitalization of areas affected by the war, occupied 
and devastated by the Serbs, was behind schedule which prevented the 
return of refugees. The number of unemployed grew rapidly while the 
foreign debt increased heavily and produced alarming social conditions.  
· The position of the military was burdened with politicization and with the 
pressure to ensure more and more high posts for praetorians and politically 
correct cadre regardless of their knowledge and participation in the 
Homeland War. This resulted not only in moral erosion and the draining 
of the scant budget, but also blocked normal development of institutions 
and a decline in military readiness, to say nothing about achieving the 
standards necessary for membership in NATO. Planning was almost an 
unknown term, transparency did not exist, and investments in new 
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equipment were inadequate. The personal policy was to conduct business 
directly from the President’s Office. Counterintelligence had the upper 
hand over intelligence and professionalism was unwelcome. 
This very short illustration of the legacy of the war and of the previous regime 
clearly shows the number of problems that needed to be addressed in an extremely short 
period of time. President Mesic openly expressed his concerns that, “our public still fails 
to grasp completely the conditions in which the new government took over the state.”175 
It seems that the new government was familiar with the problems to some extent, but was 
caught unprepared for such a large number of difficulties that had to be solved at once. 
Consequently, the new authorities missed the unique opportunity to meet the expectations 
of the people who overwhelmingly supported them during the elections. Moreover, they 
neither recognized that the toughest problems must be solved first nor understood the 
importance of the ‘short-term pain for long-term gain’ approach that was suggested by 
numerous foreign officials. Too much time was spent on intra-coalition bargaining about 
positions in the government and on finding adequate people from the respective parties 
for higher posts in state institutions which resulted in insufficient expertise and slowed 
down the process of domestic changes.  
2. Political and Economic Achievements 2000-2002 
However, after the first period of consolidation, changes became more apparent. 
The Constitution was changed and constitutional prerogatives shifted from the President 
to the Parliament and the Government. This allowed a real separation of power among 
the legislative, executive and judicial branches. The establishment of a full parliamentary 
democracy practically prevented any branch from dominating the others and established 
checks and balances among them which ensured a democratic state of affairs for a longer 
period of time. The results of such an important step forward were multifold. First of all, 
it eliminated the possibility for the restoration of authoritarianism in the long run which 
secured international support and further advancement toward a mature democracy. 
Secondly, the Parliament, representing the highest elected political body in the country, 
besides the President, resumed its powers through the adoption of organic laws and the 
(re)creation of parliamentary committees for overseeing particular areas so that it 
                                                 
175 Speech of the President of the Republic of Croatia Stjepan Mesic, given to the members of the diplomatic 
chorus at the annual reception http://www.predsjednik.hr/english/speeches/15_1_2002_1_5.html. 
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possessed the mandate to change the current state of affairs and, through its authority, to 
overcome the inertness of the state bureaucracy.  
Constitutional changes created the conditions for parliamentary and public control 
of the executive branch of the government, especially in terms of the transparency of 
budgetary issues. As a result of democratization, the majority of the media became more 
professional and NGOs took their place within society which resulted in a tremendous 
improvement in the perception of Croatian achievements. Consequently, Freedom House 
put Croatia among the top ten transitional CEE countries. 
Of the 27 countries under review in this edition, ten are now consolidated 
democracies. These are the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, as well as two new entrants: 
Bulgaria and Croatia.176  
Additionally, the US Department of State evaluated Croatia’s democratization 
when it stated “The [Croatian] government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens”177 considering that as one of the crucial prerequisites for participation in Euro-
Atlantic integration, especially for values emphasized in Article II of the Washington 
Treaty, Croatia became qualified to join. 
Changes in the economic system followed but more slowly than expected. The 
chaotic economic situation needed more than administrative measures to recover and to 
become stable so as to ensure a constant and sustainable economic growth. The ill-
managed privatization produced a large number of politically privileged entrepreneurs 
whose ability to face open market competition was questionable, and almost the same 
happened to the state owned companies. Moreover, suspicious business arrangements 
between Croatian and BiH companies made tax evasion possible in both countries and 
boosted the black markets and the gray economy. Consequently, a new wave of 
restrictive measures were introduced that, with the reorganization of the economic system 
at the macro and micro level, caused even higher unemployment along with 
                                                 
176 Nations in Transit: Emerging Dynamics of Change, 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/nitransit/2001.html. 
177 U.S. Department of State: Country Reports on Human Rights, 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/eur/8240.htm. 
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dissatisfaction with the government. Also, the public was not satisfied because of the 
expected punishment of those who privatized and led companies to bankruptcy in the 
previous regime by shipping money out of the country. That punishment, however, has 
not yet been meted out.   
Despite public frustration, things started to change, and the economic growth of 
3.5 percent in 2000 rose to 4.5 percent in 2001, with an even more optimistic forecast for 
the future. Tourism began to increase and reached figures close to the record season of 
1989.178 Always problematic, industrial production increased positively, fiscal discipline 
improved, currency reserves exceeded foreign debt, internal debt was consolidated and 
the budgetary deficit reached acceptable numbers.179 Harsh macroeconomic measures and 
the downsizing of the state apparatus, above all the police and military forces, increased 
the number of unemployed, even though these were unavoidable measures for long-term 
stabilization. However, Croatia entered a new phase in the economy of open market 
competition that, besides its positive implications, brought cruel international competition 
and survival of the fittest. Most of the Croatian companies had adapted to such 
circumstances previously, but state protected branches and companies entered the 
complicated process of accommodation with varying effects. Some became successful 
while others went bankrupt.  
3. Croatia and the EU 
The biggest improvement that ensured Croatia’s participation in various European 
and global associations happened in the area of foreign policy. Although, for various 
reasons, Croatia had waited too long for acceptance in the European community, it finally 
succeeded and entered a new phase of relations with the EU. Croatia became a member 
of WTO and, most importantly, on 29 October 2001, signed the SAA with the EU that 
started the stabilization and association process which was the culmination of an intense 
two-year effort. These factors, along with numerous bilateral free trade agreements with 
the CEE and the Balkan countries, opened Croatia’s economy and assured its continuous 
                                                 
178 Industrial production rose 6 percent and tourism 11 percent during 2001, Croatian Ministry of Finance: Bureau for 
Macroeconomic Analysis and Planning,,  http://www.mfin.hr/stat.  
179 Ibid, Croatian foreign debt reaches $11 billion, while combined state and banks currency reserves exceeded 
$13 billion.  
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presence in European markets. Thus, Croatia moved from the stalemate international 
position of the 1990s and entered the European scene.  
The significance of that huge step forward was emphasized in the speech 
delivered by the EU Commissioner Chris Patten on 29 October when he stated 
The signature of this agreement today shows just how far Croatia has 
come in 22 months. I pay warm tribute to the Croatian people for all they 
have achieved in such a short time. They set the ball of democracy rolling 
in South East Europe two years ago: this agreement shows that their 
country is moving forward at an impressive pace.180 
This speech, besides being complimentary, specified the crucial role of Croatia in 
the future stabilization of the region. Somehow, that exceptionally important event was 
not celebrated inside Croatia as an extraordinary success for the country. That is 
understandable because even “under communism, Croatia enjoyed average incomes on a 
par with Spain's. And while the collapse of communism and the war together knocked 
40% off Croatian GDP, the country is still richer than most of its neighbors.”181 Also, the 
absence of celebration happened because the Croatian people felt that the European 
attitude toward Croatia during the last ten years was more oriented toward the fabrication 
of obstacles for Croatia’s admission in the EU than for actual help.  
Reasons for such an opinion resulted from the Croatian Homeland War and the 
perception that Croatia, as the victim of aggression, was unfairly treated. The continuous 
efforts of some EU countries to appease the Serbs and to balance the responsibility for 
the war produced a sense of doubt about the real intentions of the EU. This suspicion 
became more vivid after Croatia liberated its territories in August 1995, and immediately 
received the EU announcement about breaking off all negotiations for possible Croatian 
membership. Croatia’s punishment was its classification among the Western Balkans 
countries along with Albania, BiH, Yugoslavia and Macedonia. Although it was obvious 
that as far as the economic data was concerned that Croatia did not belong in that group, 
the effects of that classification were disastrous. The Croatian GDP was $4530 and none 
                                                 
180 Statement of Commissioner Chris Patten at the signing ceremony of the Stabilization and Association 
Agreement between EU and Croatia. http://www.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/news/index.htm. 
181 Political pitfalls for Croatia's economy, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/business/newsid_1430000/1430068.stm. 
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of the other countries exceeded $1660.182 Specifically, being the most developed country 
in such a region, Croatia received the least help from the EU. Out of the 5.5 billion Euros 
received from the EU for the region between 1990-2000, the Croatian amount was 366 
million Euros while Yugoslavia received 1.5 billion which made any comments 
unnecessary. 183 Additionally, the non-existence of official candidate status for EU 
membership caused Croatia not to receive direct EU investments that were regular for 
other EU aspirants.  
Interestingly, when decisions were made about the cancellation of the foreign 
debt, the EU cancelled two-thirds of the foreign debt for Yugoslavia because of the 
‘democratic changes’ that occurred in 2000, but the same did not happen to Croatia, 
although Croatia initiated changes in the region and was the victim of Serbian aggression. 
Numerous donor conferences in the region preferred to spend money on political issues 
such as the extradition of Milosevic. In July 2001 more than $1 billion was given to 
Serbia. The result was that Croatia had to cope with its problems alone with only 
symbolic assistance from the EU. Naturally, it did not mean that Croatia had no 
obligations. On the contrary; Croatia was expected to be the driving force for the region. 
That biased approach towards Croatia contributed to its economic difficulties and, instead 
of being the second most developed country in the CEE after Slovenia, Croatia is still 
trying to approach the economic figures from 1989.184 It also suggests that Croatia cannot 
rely on the EU countries which too frequently forget about fairness in its relations with 
Croatia. 
B. CROATIA’S MEMBERSHIP IN PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE  
Croatian membership in PfP developed in a significantly different way. 
Immediately after elections, the Croatian Prime Minister visited NATO and was offered a 
program of PfP activities designed for Croatia. In March 2000, a team of NATO experts 
visited Croatia, which along with the visit of the NATO Secretary General in the same 
month, sped up the NATO invitation for Croatian participation in PfP. Finally, on 25 
May in Florence, Italy, the Croatian Minister of Foreign Affairs signed the Framework 
                                                 
182 Regional Strategy Paper 2002-2006 CARDS Assistance Program to the Western Balkans. 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/news/ip01_1464.htm. 
183 Ibid. 
184 Croatian Ministry of Finance: Bureau for Macroeconomic Analysis and Planning, http://www.mfin.hr/stat.  
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Document and Croatia officially became a PfP country. This was a small, probably 
routine, step for NATO, but for Croatia, it marked the first formal participation in Euro-
Atlantic security integration and raised expectations for full membership in NATO. 
Consequently, intensified activities followed. In June, the Croatian Minister of Defense 
participated in the EAPC session. In the same month, the Security Agreement between 
Croatia and NATO was signed, the Survey of Overall PfP Interoperability was finished 
and on the basis of the offered Partnership Goals (PG), Croatia submitted its Individual 
Partnership Programme (IPP) for 2001 along with the Presentation Document.185 The 
aforementioned activities resulted in optimistic expectations about possible Croatian 
admission to MAP in a relatively short period of time. This became more certain during 
the Bratislava meeting of MAP countries in May 2001 where Croatia entered the so-
called 'Vilnius Group.'186 The Vilnius Group, or V-10, actually represents nine NATO 
aspirants who automatically became MAP countries during the Washington summit and 
Croatia was included. 
From the very beginning of its membership in PfP, Croatian officials expressed 
their desire and willingness to enter MAP and shortening the way to NATO through 
intensive PfP activities.187 In order to achieve that strategic goal, Croatia undertook the 
appropriate organizational changes in MoD and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
established ‘The Interagency Working Group for Cooperation Between Croatia and 
NATO’ (Interagency Group) consisting of representatives from ten key ministries and the 
Office of the President with the main purpose of producing the Annual National Plan 
(ANP) as a basis for MAP. Also, after the Croatian Discussion Paper was created and 
submitted in July 2001, the process of intensified dialogue between Croatia and NATO 
started. Thus, the formal procedure for entering MAP arrived near the end of the process 
and Croatian membership in NATO became more likely. The only possible obstacles 
could be the unwillingness of the NATO members to recognize the great efforts of 
                                                 
185 Presentation given by MoD Office for NATO and PfP, Zagreb, July 2001. 
186 On May 10-11, 2001 the meeting of the Prime Ministers of the nine NATO aspirant countries took place in 
Bratislava. “Vilnius Group (V-9)”, the so-called group of the nine NATO aspirant countries, was enlarged by admitting 
Croatia. A joint statement of the nine Prime Ministers on NATO enlargement was passed at the meeting.  
http://www.urm.lt/data/4/EF031145629_news.htm. 
187 During numerous interviews with various Croatian officials, Croatian membership in NATO was emphasized 
as the only national priority with unison and unreserved support from within all political factors in the country. 
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Croatia to become a close ally, and the indecisive behavior of Croatia’s political 
representatives in ensuring a legal basis for the country’s participation in NATO. 
During the same timeframe, numerous PfP activities took place and only in the 
second half of 2000 did Croatia participate in the 47 offered activities and 12 unplanned 
activities. This number rose in 2001 to more than 160 activities and events.188 Plans for 
the year 2002 are even more ambitious. Croatia’s plan is to participate in 202 different 
events and to be the host for 17 of them. 189 It includes participation with troops, PfP 
exercise events, and exercises ‘in the spirit of PfP.’ Also, the majority of designated 
forces for participation in NATO-led PfP operations are ready, or will be ready until the 
end of 2002, which guarantees further improvement of the implementation of PARP 
based Partnership goals. In the scope of the IPP, Croatia gives the highest priority to: 
Consultation, Command and Control, including Communications and Information 
Systems (C3), Defense Policy and Strategy (DPS), Language Training (LNG), Consumer 
Logistics (LOG), Military Exercises and Related Training Activities (TEX), and Military 
Education, Training and Doctrine (TRD).190 
For the purpose of the PARP process, Croatia designated forces for operations in 
combination with NATO forces following the accepted Partnership goals. Concerning 
OCC and TEEP, Croatia is able to participate in a ‘pool of forces’ and to contribute to 
training and educational aspects of PfP particularly in terms of interoperability. The main 
reasons for confidence are Croatia’s constant involvement in NATO-led peacekeeping 
operations in BiH through various forms such as logistics and security since 1996. Also, 
the Croatian military has worked for years together with MPRI, which ensures an 
adequate level of interoperability, especially in terms of unit training and educational 
process for officers and NCO’s. That, to some extent, guarantees Croatia’s preparedness 
not only for the required level of contribution in PfP, but also the significant perspective 
for further improvement of individual and collective actions within NATO. 
 
                                                 
188 Presentation given by MoD Office for NATO and PfP, Zagreb, July 2001. 




1. Croatia’s Preparations for Membership Action Plan  
As the Croatian President stated, “we are today a member of the PfP, and we 
expect inclusion in the MAP for future members of the NATO,”191 Croatian participation 
in MAP represents the next step towards membership in the Alliance. Various reasons 
favor Croatia’s entry in the MAP process that, despite (too) long delays, could ensure that 
Southeastern Europe is on the secure path toward long lasting stabilization. Croatia’s role 
in that process is crucial. Clear confirmation of this was the wave of democratization 
following Croatian elections in the beginning of 2000. A similar process is to be expected 
in the area of security, which could decrease tensions and reduce the probability of future 
conflicts. By showing Western support for desired democratic changes, through the 
acceptance of the most advanced countries in Western integrations, the entire unstable 
region will receive a clear message about the path that others need to follow. This was 
recognized by the US Congress and its “Bill to endorse the vision of further enlargement 
of the NATO Alliance articulated by President George W. Bush on June 15, 2001”192 that 
emphasized the wish of the Vilnius Group, including Croatia, to “cooperate in jointly 
seeking NATO membership in the next round of NATO enlargement … and that eventual 
NATO membership for all of these countries would be a success for Europe and 
NATO.”193 Such a clear signal resulted in additional efforts by the Interagency Group 
that, through the formation of working bodies for each of the five chapters of ANP and 
the allocation of adequate budget resources for that purpose, completed the set of 
preparations of the Croatian government for entering MAP. Additionally, the Parliament 
adopted the set of five defense-related laws and National Security Strategy and Defense 
Strategy194 as the key strategic documents, which was necessary for legal compatibility 
with NATO and for transparency of the defense policy. Thus, Croatia fulfills almost all 
conditions for entering MAP and offers additional benefits that could not be provided by 
                                                 
191 Speech of the Croatian President Stjepan Mesic, given to the members of diplomatic corps at the annual 
reception, Zagreb, January 15, 2002, http://www.predsjednik.hr/english/speeches/15_1_2002_2_1.html. 
192 197th Congress, 1st Session, 24 October 2001, 
http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/Enlargement/documents/enlargement241001.pdf. 
193 Ibid. 
194 Defense-related laws and two core strategies were adopted in the Parliamentary session on 15 March 2002, 
Vjesnik, 16 March 2002, http://www.vjesnik.hr/html/Default.asp. 
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any other NATO aspirant country. In comparison with other MAP countries, the Croatian 
position is among the first few which offers a moderate guarantee that Croatia will take 
part in the next wave of NATO enlargement. 
2. Croatia’s Fulfillment of the Criteria of NATO Enlargement 
Even before the invitation for Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic to join 
NATO, the debate about the justifiability of NATO enlargement resulted in the 
preparation of the ‘Study on NATO Enlargement’, which gave the necessary answer to 
three crucial questions: why, how and under which principles will NATO enlarge.195 This 
led to the establishment of the necessary criteria for aspirant countries. Criteria for the 
membership in the NATO alliance are defined as follows: 
· Potential members must be prepared to defend the Alliance and have the 
professional military forces to do so 
· NATO must continue to work by consensus – new members must respect 
this tradition and abide by it 
· Military forces of new members must be capable of operating effectively 
with NATO forces. This means not only common doctrine, but also 
interoperable equipment – especially communications equipment. 
· Potential new members must uphold democracy and free enterprise, 
respect human rights inside their borders, and must respect sovereignty 
outside their borders 
· Their military forces must be under democratic, civilian control196 
Bearing these criteria in mind, Croatia is very close to fulfilling all of them. First 
of all, Croatia is the only aspirant country that has professional military forces. Of course, 
these are not comparable with the professional forces in Western countries that have 
developed their professional militaries for decades or even centuries.197 However, these 
are the facts, and, according to the given criteria, must be respected. The work by 
consensus is merely routine and there is no doubt that all aspirant countries will fulfill 
that criterion. The third criterion is twofold. The first part favors Croatia because it is the 
                                                 
195 Gerald B. Solomon, The NATO Enlargement Debate, 1990-1997, Praeger Publishers, CSIS, Westport, CT, 
1998, p. 86. 
196 The US Secretary of Defense William Perry established five fundamental principles of NATO enlargement in 
Norfolk, VA, June 27, 1996. Gerald B. Solomon: The NATO Enlargement Debate, 1990-1997, CSIS, Washington 
D.C., Praeger, Westport CT, 1998, Appendix C, p. 160.  
197 Interview with Lieutenant General Imra Agotic, Presidential Advisor for Defense and Military Affairs. During 
the interview, he emphasized the necessity for further improvement in military professionalism in order to achieve full 
interoperability with NATO countries.  
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only aspirant country that effectively operated with NATO forces during wartime. 
Moreover, the Croatian contribution to NATO’s success in achieving a durable peace in 
BiH is more than evident which offers a unique argument in favor of Croatian 
aspirations. The second part is problematic for all aspirant countries. Namely, aspirant 
countries are squeezed between two contradictory demands, from the EU to decrease the 
defense budget to the level of 2.0 percent of the GDP, while at the same time from 
NATO, to improve their military capabilities. To accomplish both of those in a short 
period of time, under the present economic situation, is impossible and, consequently, can 
only be realized in the long run.  
The fourth criterion is almost completed after Croatia, during the last period, 
demonstrated its devotion to democracy and the free market economy, along with respect 
for human rights inside its borders, and sovereignty outside its borders. However, there is 
the question of the other neighboring countries of BiH and Serbia and their respect for the 
human rights of the Croatian minority and Croatia’s sovereignty. There is still no clear 
sign that the Republika Srpska will allow Croat and Muslim refugees to return, and that 
creates a problem that Croatia cannot solve in good faith, to say nothing about denying 
the minority status of Croats in Serbia. That, along with unsettled borders with Serbia and 
Montenegro (Prevlaka), puts Croatia in a hostage position. If Croatia wants to solve these 
problems, it would need the cooperation of Serbia and the support of the international 
community which is highly questionable given earlier experiences. 
The fifth criterion underlined that military forces must be under democratic, 
civilian control. That criterion is fulfilled after the changes in the Constitution in 2000 
which established the appropriate checks and balances among the three key institutions of 
the President, the Cabinet and the Parliament. Thus, the President is the Commander- in-
Chief, the Cabinet directs and manages the military over the Minister of Defense, and the 
Parliament has control and oversight functions through its Committees. There is still 
room for improvement in terms of the creation of expert staffs in the Parliament that 
would consist of both civilian and military experts and provide the desired amount of  
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input for the Parliament’s Committees.198 Thus, control and oversight would be more 
efficient by ensuring better insight into defense matters and providing updated 
information for Committee members. Overall, it can be estimated that Croatia fulfilled 
the majority of criteria that, besides the political willingness of the Alliance members, 
can be the most important detail in the decision process for the acceptance of the Croatian 
request for joining NATO.   
3. Comparison with Other Aspirant Countries 
The extremely important moment in the process of accession to NATO will be an 
estimation of the comparative advantages and disadvantages of aspirant countries. In a 
very helpful study provided by Thomas Szayna, a number of different parameters were 
taken into consideration, providing the possibility of a comparative analysis between all 
aspirant countries and Croatia. Although he did not elaborate on Croatia, he stated that it 
depends “on NATO’s own conditions in the case of Croatia,”199 which clearly shows still 
an unresolved NATO approach towards Croatia. However, the following figures will 
demonstrate that in all given parameters Croatia deserves to be considered as a very 
serious aspirant. For the purpose of the thesis, some NATO countries are included in the 
analysis200. 
Even with some reservations about the data mentioned below, there is an obvious 
discrepancy between Croatia’s current position and its real capabilities. With the 
exception of Slovenia, Croatia is the most developed country among all the aspirant 
countries and can compete with some of the actual NATO members. Furthermore, the 
perspective of Croatia is more promising because it is still at 80.6 percent of the 1989 
living standard and at 56.9 percent of the 1989 industrial production, 201 which can be 
rapidly improved under favorable circumstances, to say nothing about the potential of 
Croatia’s tourism. All of that was achieved in spite of the war and faulty privatization. 
This adds to the confidence that under normal circumstances nothing except Western 
                                                 
198 Interview with Djurdja Adlesic, Chairwoman of National Security Committee in the Croatian Parliament. 
During the interview she stated that the level of Parliamentarian control and oversight is still not satisfactory. 
Consequently, in the forthcoming period it has to be improved through the engagement of experts from different areas 
and with different backgrounds. 
199 Thomas S. Szayna, NATO Enlargement 2000-2015, RAND, 2001, p. 35. 
200 Ibid., data are used from various tables, pp. 53-71. 
201 Croatian Ministry of Finance: Bureau for Macroeconomic Analysis and Planning,  http://www.mfin.hr/stat.  
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rejection to recognize all these facts can stop Croatia’s rapid development. There is also a 
slight possibility that because of internal power struggles, some political parties and 
politicians would prefer domestic prestige to the international success of the country.  
 







Croatia 4,282 4,974 173.4 216 Medium-high 
Albania  3,490 946 33.0 9 Low 
Bulgaria  7,797 1,552 54.1 37 Medium 
Estonia  1,431 3,564 124.2 40 High 
Latvia 2,405 2,786 97.1 19 Medium 
Lithuania  3,621 2,900 101.1 34 Medium 
Macedonia  2,041 1,666 58.1 57 Low 
Romania 22,411 1,508 52.6 24 Low 
Slovakia  5,408 3,569 124.4 65 Medium 
Slovenia  1,928 10,737 374.2 179 High 
Turkey 65,667 2,869 100.0 146  
Poland 38,646 3,987 139.0 81  
 
Table 1. Comparative Analysis between all Aspirant Countries, some NATO 
Countries and Croatia. 
 
In realm of the military, the Croatian position among MAP countries cannot be 
matched. None of the aspirant countries has a professional military, and none can provide 
troops with combat experience and real cooperation with NATO forces on the ground. 
That, along with many years of training based on US programs, offers an adequate 
quality of forces for NATO purposes. Moreover, Croatian officers are experienced in 
battle and, because of the civilian and military school systems, satisfactorily educated 
which, along with an extensively developed NCO structure, provides quality officers. 
Emphasis was placed on language training during the last seven years which resulted in a 
significant number of military personnel with exemplary language skills. Furthermore, 
Croatia proved that it could defend itself in a situation where it was outnumbered and 
outgunned against an enemy that possessed all the military advantages.202 Bearing in 
mind that the security situation in the region has improved, there is no potential aggressor 
                                                 
202 Interview with General Petar Stipetic, Chief of Croatian General Staff. 
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among neighboring countries that can harm Croatia militarily which decreases the need 
for a NATO military umbrella.  
Some of the other aspirant countries such as Estonia (5,000) and Slovenia (9,000) 
have almost symbolic military forces with no possibility of a serious military engagement 
with NATO forces.203 Others, with the exception of Slovakia, provide an insufficient 
amount of resources for qualitative maintenance of the armed forces, which could only 
result in their decreasing effectiveness. Taking into account the strategic position of each 
aspirant country, Croatia offers an uninterrupted approach to the crisis area in BiH, which 
could improve a settlement of the crisis. Unlike the situation in the Baltic states, Croatian 
admission to NATO will not provoke a negative Russian reaction that could cause 
possible complications in the relationship between NATO and Russia. Finally, Croatian 
membership in NATO would strengthen its southern wing, which is, without a doubt, the 
weakest part of the Alliance. Such advantages for membership can be hardly expected 
from any other aspirant country.  
Concerning the issues mentioned in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Report204 
which elaborates on the contribution of the aspirant countries to NATO, essential areas to 
examine for every MAP country are membership in international associations such as the 
OSCE, Council of Europe and WTO, participation in NATO’s programs such as EAPC, 
PfP and MAP, and participation in NATO-led peacekeeping operations. In addition, the 
importance of free and fair elections, human rights, a market economy, relationships with 
neighboring countries and civilian supervision over the military are also emphasized. 
Croatia fulfills all of the aforementioned elements with the exception of participation in 
MAP, which is underway, and expected to occur in the first half of 2002. Additionally, 
Croatia actively participates in numerous regional initiatives and projects such as the 
Central European initiative, Quadrilateral with Italy, Slovenia and Hungary, Alps-
Adriatic and Danube Working Communities and the Adriatic-Ionian Initiative. Especially 
important is Croatia’s contribution to the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe where it 
                                                 
203 Military strength as in NATO Parliamentary Assembly Committee Reports: Report NATO Enlargement 
http://www.naa.be/publications/comrep/2001/au-214-e.html#1. 
204 NATO Parliamentary Assembly Report AT-112-PC-CEE-001-3, http://www.nato-
pa.int/publications/comrep/2001/au-112-e.html pp. 9-19. 
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chairs the Working Table on Security Issues and to the NATO sponsored South Eastern 
European Initiative (SEEI) along with related activities and programs.  
The surprisingly successful Regional Arms Control Verification and 
Implementation Assistance Center (RACVIAC) in Zagreb, with 18 member countries, 
represents one of the best programs in the framework of the Stability Pact that, along with 
implementation of the sub-regional arms control established through the Dayton 
Agreement, offers hope for success in other areas of cooperation in the region. 205 
Additionally, the Croatian argument, besides the usage of Croatian airspace, territory, 
territorial waters, infrastructure and facilities, for NATO-led operations in BiH and 
Kosovo is the possibility for direct positive influence on the development of the political 
and economic processes in the region. That, along with a more dedicated engagement of 
the international community, could help underdeveloped countries in the region recover 
relatively quickly, and provide the basis for reconciliation and future prosperity.  
C. MUTUAL BENEFITS OF CROATIAN MEMBERSHIP IN NATO 
In terms of mutual benefits, the critical period of Croatia’s fight for pure survival 
is over, and there is no serious threat to Croatian sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
Croatia’s position in the region dramatically shifted from being part of the problem to 
becoming part of the solution. Evidently, Croatia does not need NATO for its military 
protection or materialistic benefits. Rather, there are mutual interests that can bind both 
sides in pursuing common goals. The biggest NATO interest in Europe, according to all 
the official statements, is the stabilization of Southeastern Europe. This is unerringly one 
of Croatian top priorities which offers an ideal common ground for further cooperation 
and honest long lasting relationships. In addition, recent historical developments have 
created new transnational security threats and challenges such as terrorism on a hyper-
scale, international crime and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 
Consequently, no single country can cope with it alone, which underlines the necessity of 
mutual cooperation among countries that share the same democratic values, and Croatia 
is undoubtedly one of them. Although having limited capabilities, Croatia’s visible 
                                                 
205 Interview with Col. Nikola Nogolica, Commander of the RACVIAC. 
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contribution to the worldwide antiterrorist coalition illustrates that even small countries 
can be extremely helpful when mutual cooperation exists. 
1. Croatian Benefits 
The list of possible benefits of NATO membership for Croatia is much shorter 
than would be expected. Namely, in addition to feeling as if belonging to a group of 
nations that share the same values and “are determined to safeguard the freedom, 
common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded of principles of democracy, 
individual liberty and rule of law,”206 Croatia’s benefits would basically be in political 
and economic areas, or in other words, collective security without emphasizing its 
military component. The experience of the NATO enlargement in 1999 clearly shows 
that its effects are most dramatic in the realms of security in general and, more 
specifically, in politics and the economy. Namely, since the introduction of the previous 
wave of NATO enlargement in 1997, all new members registered only increasing 
economic numbers and particularly in the area of foreign investment. The security picture 
in Europe improved also, and “none of the fears of Enlargement opponents materialized: 
NATO military effectiveness, political cohesion and decision making were not 
weakened.”207 Additionally, domestic politics inside newcomer states showed impressive 
stability, which became yet another motivating element for other aspirant countries. The 
least improvement actually occurred in the area of the military where the cost of 
economic transformation and budget limitations prevented extensive modernization. 
However, after economic consolidation, there is enough room for improvement in the 
military sphere also.  
Naturally, Croatia expects that it can avoid the negative consequences of being 
treated as a part of Daytonland or the Western Balkans through NATO membership. That 
position is closely connected with gloomy stereotypes and, consequently, with the 
perceived instability that automatically prevents any substantial amount of foreign 
investment and decreases economic growth. As a member of NATO, Croatia will be 
perceived differently, and all its potential will be brought forth which will bring more 
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prosperity not only to the Croatian people, but also to Croatia’s neighboring countries. By 
reducing the number of insecure areas, Croatia will actually help the international 
community concentrate on problems in BiH and Serbia.208 Consequently, without the 
Balkan’s hypothecation, Croatia can improve its economy and, as in the case of Slovenia, 
become one of the most prosperous transition countries in the CEE. With NATO 
membership, the Croatian economy can flourish, especially through the development of 
1,700 kilometers of the most beautiful coastal area in Europe. As a result, economic 
prosperity automatically stimulates other aspects of societal life and ensures positive 
trends in both security and politics. 
The next benefit for Croatia is the implementation of certain standards politically 
that incorporate institutional behavior according to strict rules, which is necessary for 
Croatia’s still underdeveloped state institutions. By being part of a bigger system, smaller 
and inexperienced countries often imitate proven solutions used by mature democracies, 
which spare them years of searching for applicable models along with the resources spent 
for such purposes. With NATO membership, some standards are conditio sine qua non 
for normal functioning, which inevitably results in an accelerated tempo of adaptation of 
the state apparatus to new circumstances. A new automatism in bureaucratic behavior 
would convert the currently ‘unsolvable political problems’ into routinely handled and 
solved matters. The desirable functioning of state institutions, at least those connected 
with security matters, and the establishment of routinely performed democratic 
procedures is beneficial to Croatia and equally important economically. 
Finally, the most important benefit to Croatia will be the feeling of belonging to a 
circle of countries that share the same values.209 It will be a kind of payback for the 
centuries of Croatian attempts to escape buffer zones, divisions, wars, expulsions, ethnic 
cleansings and forced emigrations, and to take its worthy place among European nations. 
Obviously, Croatia is not asking for a privileged position, but also cannot accept an 
underestimated one. All that Croatia needs is an appropriate place according to its real 
potentials. In short, what would be most beneficial to Croatia would be to offer it a 
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chance to prove itself in normal competition, under equal rules, and without any biased 
approach. NATO’s benefits in that case will by far be greater, and what NATO gains 
from such a position by Croatia is already obvious. 
2. NATO Benefits 
Paradoxically, Croatian membership in NATO offers more benefits to NATO 
than to Croatia. First of all, there is the increase in the security and stability zone in the 
most troublesome region of Europe or Southeastern Europe.210 With Croatia in the 
Alliance, NATO can encompass most of the Adriatic area and transform it into a highly 
stable zone that will ensure more security to Italy and Slovenia, and provide an 
uninterrupted territorial continuum from the Mediterranean to the Baltic Sea. Expansion 
of the stability area automatically decreases the likelihood of any aggressive attempt or 
conflicting situation in the region, especially inside BiH, but also in Kosovo. From a 
psychological point of view, Croatian membership will create positive competition inside 
Serbia that will result in greater Serbian cooperativeness with the international 
community and, eventually, in real democratization instead of the current quasi-
democracy and provisional solutions. With that achievement, the crises in BiH and 
Kosovo will be solvable in a democratic way, without unnecessary tensions and constant  
pressure on an already exhausted population. Also, it will make it possible that, after 
many years of engagement of all imaginable international organizations, the stalemate 
situation in BiH would start to improve and finally stabilize. Probably, the resolution of 
the BiH crisis will represent one of NATO’s biggest achievements and an end to the 
process that commenced more than a decade ago. Additionally, if Bulgaria and Romania 
become NATO members, along with Albania’s and Montenegrin’s obvious 
democratization, the crisis region will be contained to the smallest area possible. 
Geo-strategically, Croatian membership will provide NATO with an opportunity 
to cover one of Europe’s most momentous junctions of transit corridors.211 Being at the 
same time a Central European, Mediterranean and Danubian country, Croatia is a natural 
connection between Western Europe and the Balkans, between the Mediterranean and 
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Central Europe, participating in transportation areas not only with highways and 
railroads, but also with ports, pipeline and river transport on the Danube, to say nothing 
about air transportation. The recent interest of Russian oil companies to invest in the 
Croatian pipeline (Serbian and BiH refineries also receive oil through that facility) and in 
the conversion of part of the Rijeka port for the export of Russian oil opens a new race 
for control of the pipeline between Western and Russian investors.  
The Adriatic-Ionian highway, with the construction of some parts already started, 
will connect Italy with Greece along the Croatian coast, which will ensure a reliable 
connection with Western Europe for Albania and Montenegro. Hungary’s natural exits to 
the sea are Croatian ports that, along with European highway corridors V. and X., will 
transform Croatian infrastructure during the next decade or so into a network of 
internationally important transportation routes. Moreover, the geographic position of BiH 
limited its access to the sea and Western Europe through Croatian territory and this could 
improve economic and other links between the two states. The planned channel between 
the rivers Danube and Sava will shorten the distance and develop Croatian and BiH ports 
along the Sava river. All of this indicates a huge perspective of the Croatian economy and 
the direct and indirect influence of Croatia on most of its neighboring countries, which 
can enormously contribute to NATO’s intention of providing a more stable and secure 
Europe.  
Furthermore, the Croatian military and civilian facilities of ports, airfields, bases, 
infrastructure, and naval repair facilities212 and their usage for NATO purposes can lessen 
NATO’s expenditures not only for NATO-led operations in BiH and Kosovo, but also for 
future NATO needs. The Croatian military is in the middle of downsizing, and numerous 
facilities will be simply abandoned, which offers a unique opportunity for using them as 
NATO bases under extremely accommodating terms. Thus, both sides can benefit. 
Croatia will avoid the expenses of closing the bases and NATO will avoid new 
investments in facilities that are necessary for its current and future needs. This is 
especially true for naval facilities, because once tourism in Croatia reaches its zenith, and 
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the process of ten percent yearly growth has already started, it will be hard to believe that 
there will be any available space for adequate accommodations in the future.  
Also, the Croatian military, especially the Croatian Army, can offer officers, 
NCO’s and soldiers with battle experience and willingness and opportunity to participate 
in NATO-led forces in any combat, peacekeeping or peacemaking operation. The survey 
conducted by the Croatian MOD in May 2001 shows that the vast majority of the 90.27 
percent of military servicemen/women supported Croatian membership in NATO, while 
87.28 percent considered Croatia’s membership in PfP just as important for the security 
of the state.213 A surprisingly high level of support is the best confirmation of the mood 
within the Croatian military. 
Unlike other aspirant countries, the Croatian military has implemented US 
programs and training standards since 1994 not only in theory, but also in practice during 
operations in 1995 in Croatia and BiH. In terms of military readiness for participation in 
NATO-led peacekeeping or peacemaking operations, there is no question that NATO can 
only benefit from the presence of Croatian soldiers in the crisis areas. The best 
confirmation of this is the experience in Sierra Leone where a small number of Croatian 
officers performed a disproportionally significant role at critical moments. Also, the 
experience of the Croatian military in cooperation with NATO-led forces in BiH, 
although being of a mostly supportive nature, confirms the readiness of the Croatian 
Armed Forces for cooperation with NATO without impediments. Furthermore, the recent 
acquisition of US radars and communication equipment, along with the constant 
education of officers, NCO’s and soldiers, and training of units through US based 
programs guarantee a reasonable level of interoperability with NATO forces. The only 
obstacle is an insufficient level of NATO compatible armament and technical equipment, 
but that is notorious in all aspirant countries.  
D. POSSIBLE OBSTACLES FOR CROATIAN MEMBERSHIP IN NATO 
There are two possible sources of obstacles to Croatia’s acceptance in Euro-
Atlantic institutions: domestic and international. Domestic obstacles are minute, mostly 
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resulting from internal political struggles among parties, or different political options 
inside individual parties. International obstacle s are more serious and rooted in decades 
of biased policy toward the Croatian nation in general, along with the creation of 
unfavorable circumstances for Croatian participation in the core Euro-Atlantic 
institutions of NATO and the EU. 
1. Domestic Obstacles 
All aspirant countries, just like Croatia, have some percentage of supporters from 
the extreme left and the extreme right parties that, interestingly, share certain interests, 
for example, opposition to international institutions.214 Membership in NATO and the EU 
is opposed by the extreme left because of its antiglobalism and antimilitarism, which 
combined with followers of subculture movements from anarchists to Hare Krishnas, 
represents an opposition insignificant in numbers, but very noisy in appearance. Their 
opposition is disorganized and used more for attracting media attention, and therefore, 
cannot be taken too seriously. The extreme right’s arguments against any participation in 
European and global association are mainly connected with the protection of national 
purity and the preservation of sovereignty in its atavistic sense. Having considerable 
support in Croatia, up to ten percent, which is understandable after the war and national 
homogenization, the extreme right can use unfavorable circumstances to receive greater 
support and, together with the moderate right parties, to postpone Croatia’s entry in 
NATO and the EU for a certain period of time. Such a scenario is very unlikely because 
of the right’s patriotism, which will prevent it from weakening the country’s position in 
the international community and, particularly, in relationships with the US and the West.  
The only real domestic obstacle for Croatian participation in Euro-Atlantic 
institutions is a preoccupation of the domestic parties and politicians with their mutual 
and internal struggle for power that prevents them from reaching a consensus about basic 
Croatian interests and goals. They obviously need to be repeatedly reminded of the old 
saying that the state has no friends, but interests and that some periods of history offer no 
room for hesitation and delaying, particularly not for fruitless mutual fighting. Sometimes 
that struggle goes to the level of personal animosities, which is irresponsible from a state 
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perspective and unacceptable from the viewpoint of citizens. Consequently, such 
behavior makes any decision-making too slow and questionable. That, along with the 
notoriously unprofessional media, creates confusion and a lack of confidence in 
politicians as elected representatives of its citizens. For example, the final agreement 
about the set of laws that covered the military and security system has been reached after 
two years of indecisive haggling with the end results similar to the initial proposals, but 
with a significant loss of irretrievable and precious time. That indecisiveness and 
irresponsiveness about the most crucial issues and, at the same time, an obsession with 
trivialities on a daily basis, can produce the appearance of a country uninterested in 
undergoing any integration processes in Europe, which can be disastrous. 
Financial concerns about the cost of NATO membership are also significant,215 
although the cost of collective defense in the long run appears to be significantly less than 
for the individual defense. A potential, but not worrisome, obstacle in the military can be 
the cadre inherited from the JNA that cannot change their attitude toward 
professionalism, which, along with the politically promoted cadre during the HDZ times, 
could slow down, but not stop, the process of approaching NATO. However, the recent 
legal changes in defense-related laws allowed a broad spectrum of possible solutions for 
the de-politicization of the military, which will marginalize opponents of reforms.  
Additionally, during the war many powerful individuals emerged in all segments 
of societal life. They are wealthy even by Western standards, but their wealth is closely 
connected with illegal businesses or even with organized crime. It is not in their interest 
for the situation in Croatia and the region to become normal. Thanks to their influence 
not only in the economic sphere, but also in the realm of politics and the military, they 
will try to obstruct any change that leads to the establishment of a normal state of affairs. 
Those individuals are not to be underestimated, mostly because they will stop at nothing 
and they can use all means available in that milieu for achieving their goals. Beside the 
aforementioned obstacles, there is no serious opposition in Croatia for membership either 
in NATO or the EU. 
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2. International Obstacles 
The extremely complicated international approach to the crisis in the region since 
it began in the late 1980s resulted in entangled Western relationships not only towards 
individual countries in the region, but also negatively influenced mutual relations among 
the Western allies. Numerous international actors, both states and international 
organizations, involved in a solution to the crisis, produced a Gordian knot of interwoven 
interests and contradictory goals, and Croatia could not satisfy all of these sometimes 
contradictory demands. Namely, in the case of pursuing goals connected with potential 
NATO membership, such as interoperability, military acquisition, and so on, Croatia will, 
through increased military spending, automatically jeopardize the EU demands for the 
two percent military participation in the GDP. Also, following EU requests for close 
economic cooperation and free trade agreements with chaotic economies in Serbia and 
BiH, Croatia endangers its own security interests and decreases its stability, which poses 
a risk for its admittance to NATO. Additionally, because of still unsolved problems of the 
succession of the ex-state216, Croatia cannot fully accept demands for reconciliation in 
circumstances where Serbian nationalism still runs high. Neighboring countries will 
perceive indulgent Croatian behavior as a sign of weakness and an implicit confirmation 
of the justifiability of their politics, which cannot be accepted. Constant international 
pressure on Croatia to be a better Catholic than the Pope, and insisting on the behavior 
according to the highest possible standards, which is often avoided by the same countries 
that insist on it, such as the British role in Northern Ireland which is probably the best 
example, results in confusion and the questioning of the real intentions of the West.  
There obviously is a need for coordinating common goals and interests among 
Western states and organizations that can establish clear and unambiguous patterns of 
behavior that can be the path to follow not only for Croatia, but also for other aspirant 
countries. Without a uniform Western policy towards the region, countries will sail 
between Scylla’s and Charybdis’ of confusing and conflicting demands of Western 
individual interests. This can produce unsolvable obstacles for any aspirant country, 
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including Croatia, and result in debatable outcomes. Currently, there is no better solution 
than stronger US engagement and leadership in solving discrepancies in the Western 
approach, and not only, to NATO enlargement. The essential role of the US, as the only 
world superpower and relatively unbiased actor in puzzling circumstances, can put an end 
to Europe’s failure to find a reasonable solution for the Croatian situation and to 
eventually stabilize the region. Unlike Europeans, the US is not burdened by historical 
attachments to any side that participated in the conflict which offers the opportunity to 
fairly judge Croatia’s position. 
Although having strong verbal support from the EU, based on Croatian 
democratic achievements that caused changes in BiH and Serbia, “it was Croatia – let us 
not forget – that got things moving … we (EU) need substantially to increase our 
financial support for Croatia,”217 in practice it was not followed by any substantial help, 
which undermines the credibility of EU promises. Only receiving compliments cannot 
improve the Croatian economy and speed up its admission to Western institutions, 
especially when those compliments are followed by pressure from the International 
Tribunal in Hague (ICTY), which regularly occurs before every tourist season. The usage 
of the ICTY for political and economic pressure on Croatia is more than obvious, 
particularly when compared with the ICTY approach to war criminals in Serbia. The big 
story about Croatian uncooperativeness is actually used for covering up the fact that 
numerous Serbian war criminals from Vukovar over Srebrenica to Kosovo are still free 
and even hold high posts in the Serbian political and military establishment. The current 
Serbian president is on the ICTY list and the current chief of the Serbian general staff is 
also a candidate for the Hague. Even worse, Serbia’s ‘cooperativeness’ was awarded with 
large grants of over $1 billion at donor conferences and a cancellation of one-third of its 
foreign debt. Naturally, such an approach causes a revolt among Croatian citizens and 
diminishes confidence in international institutions, resulting in a growing number of 
domestic opponents to Croatian membership in Western institutions.  
Finally, international pressure on Croatia for the return of Croatian Serbs who 
went to BiH and Serbia in 1995, and who refuse to stay in Croatia and behave as regular 
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citizens represents another mechanism for constant pressure on the Croatian government. 
The fact that half the Croatian Serbs never left Croatia and that almost 100,000 Croatian 
Serbs returned to Croatia, while the same is not allowed for Croats and Muslims in the 
Republika Srpska, obviously cannot be completely understood by Western officials. 
Consequently, one-sided pressure on Croatia reflects on its pace of democratization and 
encourages Serbs in BiH to continue with their policy. At the same time, Croatia copes 
with refugees from BiH and Serbia with little or no help from the outside, which 
represents a heavy economic burden and complicates the internal political scene by 
offering additional arguments to adversaries for Croatian isolationism from the West.  
E. CONCLUSION  
The results of Croatia’s elections in January 2000 caused a flood of domestic, 
political, economic and military changes. Moreover, the newly elected authorities 
fundamentally altered Croatia’s unfavorable international position and improved relations 
with the neighboring countries. This initiated political changes in BiH and Serbia and 
transformed the region into a more stable area with a firm perspective for further 
stabilization. Such astonishing results were accompanied by a warming of relations with 
Western countries, which resulted in Croatia’s quick accession to various European 
institutions. However, there is still a considerable amount of effort to exert in the future, 
especially in terms of membership in two core Euro-Atlantic institutions, NATO and the 
EU. “Entry in the NATO is a strategic goal of the Republic of Croatia which permanently 
resolves the issue of security and concurrently confirms the achievement of the highest 
criteria in the democratic civil control of armed forces.”218 When considering this, 
Croatia is trying to fulfill the necessary preconditions to prepare itself for the decisive 
Prague summit and hopes that the numerous advantages of Croatian membership would 
be recognized. 
Most of the preparations have been completed, which when paired with the many 
benefits that NATO can achieve with Croatia as a member of the Alliance, offers a strong 
basis for optimism. Croatian comparative advantages are obvious and easy to document. 
The positive experience with the previous wave of enlargement eliminated the doubts that 
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the second round of enlargement could supposedly complicate or worsen the security 
relations between the new NATO members and non-NATO countries. Quite to the 
contrary, NATO membership proved itself to be the best way to improve good-
neighborly relations. In that light, Croatian membership in NATO can play a decisive 
role in the stabilization of BiH and Serbia, which will ensure their democratization and 







The only limit to our realization of tomorrow will be our doubts of today. 
Let us move forward with strong and active faith. 219 Franklin D. Roosevelt 
 
This thesis has provided comprehensive evidence that Croatia’s membership in 
NATO might easily be the most beneficial step for both sides and the entire region under 
the present circumstances. Becoming a NATO member would be an accolade in the 
centuries long tendency of Croatia to establish itself as an independent and sovereign 
country ready and willing to participate in progressive and democratic international 
processes, and do so in a peaceful and political manner. This attitude guided Croatia in its 
attempts to be an equal partner in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, in the process of 
forming the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and in Croatian attempts to resolve 
problems within Yugoslavia at all stages in a parliamentary way. There were dark times 
in Croatia’s past, as in all other European countries, especially during WWII. Today’s 
Croatia recognizes and condemns its responsibility in this matter. The Homeland War 
and Croatian participation in resolving the BiH crisis demonstrate that Croatia has 
successfully overcome the political and social position that brought about those dark 
times and that Croatia has become a reliable NATO partner in the region. 
NATO has changed over the course of the fifty years of its existence, especially 
during the last ten years. The military machinery in the state of readiness on this side of 
the Iron Curtain back in the Cold War was cautious about any influence and cooperation 
with the countries in the East. Today’s NATO is a more mature political organization, 
and the leader in most cooperation and integration processes throughout Europe. The 
substantial proof of NATO’s developed confidence and maturity is Partnership for Peace, 
with 29 CEE member countries, including NATO’s Cold War archenemy, Russia. Ten of 
those Partners are also aspirant nations for the next round of NATO enlargement.  
The role of the U.S. concerning European security is still decisive. Although U.S. 
involvement in Europe has varied in intensity, and changed over time, the crisis in the 
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former Yugoslavia demonstrated that the U.S. had and still has an irreplaceable impact on 
Europe. In many respects, the U.S. has shown an unprecedented resolve in dealing with 
the BiH crisis and its conclusion, and at the same time ending the period of NATO’s 
preoccupation with itself. U.S. and NATO involvement in BiH and the duration of this 
involvement also helped to reestablish the U.S. leadership within the Alliance as well. 
The recent changes in Croatia, starting in 2000, have revealed a new, market-
oriented and democratic Croatia. Those changes have been successful in terms of 
domestic politics and have been recognized by the international community. The amazing 
aspect of those changes is that they occurred within two years and despite the heavy 
burden left by the previous government and the aftermath of the war. The government 
would not have been able to achieve this without strong support from the people of 
Croatia. This demonstrated not only that the Croatian leaders, but also Croatia as a whole, 
is ready for integration into Western institutions. This readiness is evident when 
comparing Croatia and other NATO aspirant countries. 
Currently, the most problematic region in Europe is the territory of states that 
emerged after the disintegration of Yugoslavia. It was a battlefield where nations tried to 
articulate their identities. Hesitating and inadequate reactions of the international 
community, including NATO members, at the beginning of the crisis, produced a set of 
unsolved problems that have dominated the region ever since. However, the engagement 
of the US-led NATO has not yet reached the desired outcome. The region continues to be 
unstable, with stabilization processes frozen somewhere between the proclaimed good 
intentions and the existing bureaucratic complications. The domestic politics in BiH and 
Serbia, although undergoing considerable change, have not yet achieved the expected 
improvements, while the situation in Macedonia became even worse. Democratic trends 
in Montenegro and Albania are still fragile, and offer no guarantee for continued 
advancement. Obviously, these demand a more focused and assertive engagement of all 
available domestic and international forces interested in peace and democratization in the 
region.  
Given the current situation in the region, there is more than just declarative 
support and promising plans that must be completed in order to ensure genuine 
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stabilization and permanent development of every nation in the region. The first real step 
forward will be the acceptance of Croatia in Euro-Atlantic institutions, which will speed 
up its development and, at the same time, produce the model of behavior that will 
strengthen democratic tendencies in the rest of the region. Thus, a clear signal will be 
sent to all political forces advocating democratization that they must persist in this 
manner and reduce the influence of nationalists on domestic and foreign policy.  
Among the international officials who understand the importance of providing a 
role-model for transition countries is the High Representative for BiH, Lord Ashdown, 
who thanked the Croatian Government for “its constructive policy towards BiH and 
requested equally attentive support in the future.”220 The example of Croatia’s 
advancement in only two years can represent the paradigm for BiH and Serbia that will 
allow the realization of common goals such as stabilization, democratization and 
prosperity of individual countries and the whole region. To achieve this, the following 
conditions must be satisfied: 
· The impact of Croatia’s democratization and membership in Euro-Atlantic 
institutions must be used as a clear example and a landmark for BiH and 
Serbia which will ensure their wholehearted participation in the process of 
stabilization and democratization 
· Engagement of the international community, particularly NATO and the 
EU, must be unified and clearly defined and thus will avoid the 
overlapping competencies of various institutions and confusing 
interpretations of future goals 
· Democratic forces inside the countries in the region must be unequivocally 
supported and assisted. This can offer a reasonable perspective for the 
people in the region and encourage them to overcome the burden of their 
recent past, such as war criminals still at large, etc. 
Thus, through synergic advancement on all three fronts, regional stability and 
prosperity can be achieved, and greater future cooperation can occur. This will 
automatically solve the problem of individual liberties and human rights and make the 
possibility of democratic peace the only option. 
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The stabilization process in the southeastern corner of Europe will depend not 
only on Croatia, but also on the international community and especially the U.S.- led 
NATO Alliance. Their interests in peace and stability in the region, together with the 
search for fair and objective solutions to the existing problems, will be of utmost 
importance. As of September 11, 2001, the security issues in the region became 
interconnected with the global security situation. The initial reports of groups connected 
with international terrorism in BiH confirmed this. The prompt reaction of Croatia and its 
full participation in the anti- terrorist coalition is an unmistakable signal that Croatia is 
ready to take on its fair share of responsibility in fighting terrorism. In the light of those 
events, regional stabilization became conditio sine qua non for consolidating the 
international forces against the new threat. This stabilization demands additional efforts 
not only from the people that have already suffered too much, but also from the 
international community that, through fair and assertive engagement of its institutions, 
can bring an end to the instability in Southeastern Europe and thus improve the overall 
security situation.   
The greatest opportunity to bring this about is the next round of NATO 
enlargement in 2002 which, along with the enlargement of the EU in 2003, offers new 
hope for normalizing the situation. By including new members in the European 
mainstream, the concentration of efforts on the remaining few countries would make it 
possible for them to also improve their positions. This would be even easier with the help 
of the new members who would be able to share their invaluable experiences and thus 
pave the way for others towards NATO and EU membership. Croatia is able and willing 
to participate in such an undertaking for the sake of lasting peace and increasing stability 
in the region. A democratic and prosperous Croatia, in a peaceful and stable environment, 
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